

Exhibit A

No. 23-1967

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

MARY SEGUIN

v.

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; Rhode Island OFFICE OF Child Support Services in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island

**APPELLANT’S MOTION RECONSIDERTION OF DISTRICT COURT
DENIALS OF APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL OR AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
PURSUANT TO Fed. R. App. P 27(b), 26(b)(1) and 4(a)(5)(A)**

Pursuant to the Court’s March 1, 2024 Court Order that states, “The
appellant shall inform this court whether or not she intends to file a notice of
appeal or amended notice of appeal from the district court's post-judgment order,”
and “ See also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (allowing the district court to grant an
extension of time to file a notice of appeal if the party so moved no later
than 30 days after the time prescribed by Rule 4(a) expires)” (Case: 23-1967
Document: 00118115155 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Entry ID: 6626341)
Appellant, MARY SEGUIN, hereby respectfully moves the Court to reconsider the
Appellant’s timely motions for an extension of time for 30 days to April 2, 2024.

**DISTRICT COURT DENIALS OF COURT COMPLIANT TIMELY Fed. R.
App. P 4(a)(5) MOTION CONSISTENTLY WRONGLY APPLYING
“EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE”**

I. Fed. R. App. P 27(b), 26(b)(1), and 4(a)(5)(A)

Firstly, Appellant respectfully files this motion for reconsideration pursuant to a plain reading of the text of Fed. R. App. P 27(b), 26(b)(1), and 4(a)(5)(A).

In relevant part, **Fed. R. App. 27(b)** states, “The court may act on a motion for a procedural order—including a motion under **Rule 26(b)**—at any time without awaiting a response, and may, by rule or by order in a particular case, authorize its clerk to act on specified types of procedural motions. A party adversely affected by the court's, or the clerk's, action may file a motion to *reconsider*...”

In relevant part, **Fed. R. App. 26(b)(1)** states, “26(b) Extending Time. For **good cause**, the court may extend the time prescribed by these rules or by its order to perform any act, or may permit an act to be done after that time expires. But the court may not extend the time to file:

(1) a notice of appeal (**except** as authorized in **Rule 4**)”

In relevant part, **Fed. R. App. 4(a)(5)(A)** states, “(5) *Motion for Extension of Time*.

(A) The district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if:

(i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires; and

(ii) regardless of whether its motion is filed before or during the 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires, that party shows excusable neglect or good cause.

Taken together, this Appellate Court has the authority under Fed. R. App. P. **27(b)**, **26(b)(1)** and **4** conferred to it, to reconsider and extend under **27(b)** and **26(b)(1)** the time to file a notice of appeal or amended Notice of Appeal of the district court's denials (of Appellant's timely motions for extension of time) consistently wrongly applying "excusable neglect" to a *distortion* of the facts under "extraordinary circumstances" in order to deny the demonstrated showing of good cause evidenced in this Court's March 1, 2024 Court order issued on Day 29 of the 30 day tolling of the district court's February 1, 2024 court order.

Accordingly, while Appellant's herein motion for reconsideration is pending before this Court, Appellant simultaneously filed a motion to stay (pursuant to Fed. R. App. P 8) the district court's extension denials to suspend the tolling of time to file Appellant's Notice of Appeal.

In aid of the Court, Appellant requests judicial notice of the fact that it is in the interest of judicial economy to incorporate the most recent post-judgment issues arising from the district court's February 1, 2024 order, itself caused by and arising from the district court's *sua sponte* November 20, 2023 TEXT ORDER that de facto sua sponte **reconsiders** the district court's pre-appeal denials of the exact Appellant's post-judgment motions under Fed. R. Civ P 59 and 60 that Judge Smith obstructed from docketing into the record in violation of, *inter alia*, Fed. R. Civ. P 79. Because the fact of the matter remains (evidenced and preserved in the

record in ECF 32) the Appellant did **NOT** file any new Rule 59 or Rule 60 post-judgment motions after the Notice of Appeal dated November 17, 2023, and the district was **divested of jurisdiction** when it *sua sponte* issued the November 20, 2023 district court TEXT ORDER ordering ensuing *reconsideration* of allegedly the “merits” of *exactly the same pre-appeal Rule 59 and Rule 60 motions that the district court had already denied pre-appeal*. Post-appeal, limited jurisdiction is retained by the district court only to consider a rule 59 or rule 60 motion that the district court had not denied pre-appeal, or to consider a rule 59 or rule 60 motion that the Appellant files after the filing the November 17, 2023 Notice of Appeal. ***The district court does not have any jurisdiction to reconsider post-appeal the district court’s pre-appeal denials.*** No reasonable argument by Judge Smith based in law or fact can be made that jurisdictionally-devoid post-appeal reconsideration by a district court of its pre-appeal denials of the exactly same rule 59 and 60 motions would actually be “in aid of the court.” Appellant filed the November 17, 2023 Notice of Appeal subsequent to the two district court denials of her timely November 16, 2023 rule 59 motions and November 17, 2023 rule 60 motion.

As evidence to support this presented fact, Appellant attached hereto as **Exhibit A** the district clerk certified record of appeal dated November 17, 2023, ECF 33, 33-1 (**see page 9 of 92 in ECF 33-1 of the docket sheet**), that factually

and critically demonstrates **no entry** under **11/17/2023** of ECF 34, 34-1, 35, 35-1, 37, 37-1.

Judge Smith's *sua sponte* post-appeal November 20, 2023 text order that is devoid of jurisdiction instructed the district clerks to ***alter the record*** of appeal (tamper with the record of appeal) by materially entering into the docket under November 17, 2023 Appellant's timely rule 59 motions that were filed with the district court clerk on **November 16, 2023** (see ECF 34-1 and ECF 35-1) so that Appellant's timely Rule 59 motions falsely appear filed out-of-time, and to enter the Rule 60(b)(1) motion as ECF 37, 37-1, which ECF 37-1 show the time stamp of the email filing, all demonstrating Judge Smith reviewed, considered and denied all three motions in his two November 17, 2023 text orders. This district court November 20, 2023 entry of Appellant's pre-appeal **denied motions is calculated to make it falsely appear that the motions were not yet disposed of at the time of Appellant's filing of the November 17, 2023 Notice of Appeal.**

The docket sheet certified by the clerk and transferred to this Court on November 17, 2023 in ECF 33, ECF 33-1 (see page 9 of 77 in ECF 33-1) demonstrates evidence that the district court already disposed of and denied Appellant's motions pre-Appeal.

Since this is a procedure motion, Appellant reserves and preserves all rights to raise at the appropriate time the motive behind the docketing obstruction and subsequent alteration, but it can be thus summarized: the intent to interfere with and thwart appellate review of the Amended Complaint (ECF 25) reporting to “some judge.... of the United States” of the existence of 42 U.S.C. 655 penalties resulting from 42 U.S.C. 654 and 42 U.S.C. 666 violations accrued by the Rhode Island Defendants-Appellees, that in some instances date back since 1996, of routine false accounting to the United States and other states’ authorities involving the covered-up taking off and putting back onto the 42 USC 654a-mandated Social Security Act Title IV-mandated automated system of, *inter alia*, removals of actual support payments, unlawful compound interests, and falsified accounting sent interstate to federal and state law enforcement authorities and to Title IV Program-protected non-custodial parents. Those penalties may run upward towards hundreds of millions of dollars into billions, if accrued since 1996.

II. FACTUAL TRAVEL OF THE GOOD CAUSE Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)(A) motions filed in District Court

On March 1, 2024, this Court issued its Order, *See*, (Case: 23-1967 Document: 00118115155 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Entry ID: 6626341). The Court’s March 1, 2024 Court Order that states, “The appellant shall inform this court whether or not she intends to file a notice of appeal or amended notice of appeal

from the district court's post-judgment order,” and “ See also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (allowing the district court to grant an extension of time to file a notice of appeal if the party so moved no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by Rule 4(a) expires).” *See* paragraph 3 of Order (Case: 23-1967 Document: 00118115155 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Entry ID: 6626341).

Under Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)(A), this Court’s issuance of the March 1, 2024 Court Order that vacated the Court’s previously issued January 22, 2024 briefing schedule, and explicitly stating in the text of the Order directing the Appellant to “inform this court whether or not she intends to file a notice of appeal or amended notice of appeal from the district court's post-judgment order,” and “ See also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (allowing the district court to grant an extension of time to file a notice of appeal if the party so moved no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by Rule 4(a) expires)” makes clear that this Order is the GOOD CAUSE basis to move for extension of time under **Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)** that this Court *explicitly instructed the Appellant*, since the Order affects any and all preparation of the filing of an amended Notice of Appeal or a Notice of Appeal.

Accordingly, in compliance with the Court’s March 1, 2024 Order, Appellant diligently and in good faith filed in the district court on March 1, 2024 the Order prescribed Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) Motion for Extension of Time, and immediately afterwards, filed here in this Court Appellant’s Notice dated March 1,

2024 notifying this Court Appellant complied with the Court’s Order by filing the explicitly instructed Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) motion for an extension of time in the district court and informing the Court that Appellant intends to file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal. *See* Appellant’s March 1, 2024 Notice (See, e.g., (Case: 23-1967 Document: 00118115266 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Entry ID: 6626396) – “APPELLANT’S NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S SUBMISSION/FILING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME PURSUANT TO Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)”; *See also, e.g.*, ECF 49. Friday, March 1, 2024 is **29** days after the district court’s jurisdictionally devoid February 1, 2024 order.

PLAIN READING OF THE TEXT OF Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)

Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) Motion for Extension of Time states as follows:

Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)(A)(i) states, “a party so moves no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires; and”

Fed R. App. P 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) states, “regardless of whether its motion is filed before or during the 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires, that party shows excusable neglect or good cause.”

Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)(C) states, “No extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time or 14 days after the date when the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later.”

Therefore, a plain textual reading of Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) Motion for Extension of Time makes clear that **good cause** is the standard of review to be applied by the district court of Appellant’s Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) Motion for Extension of Time filed on Friday, March 1, 2024 that is 29 days from the district court February 1, 2024 order. Appellant **showed good cause** for a 30 day extension **based on the this Court’s aforesaid March 1, 2024 Court Order** *that explicitly says to the Appellant to file a Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) motion for extension of time if necessary, since the Court’s Order affects the Appellant’s “intent to file a Notice of Appeal or an amended Notice of Appeal” and the preparation of the Notice of Appeal* – therefore pursuant to the appellate rule’s prescribed **good cause showing**, Appellant requested the 30 days extension to adequately review and consider this Court’s March 1, 2024 Court Order that affects Appellant’s preparation of the Notice of Appeal. *See this Court’s 03/01/2024 Court Order (Case: 23-1967 Document: 00118115155 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Entry ID: 6626341)*

However, the district court did not review Appellant's timely 29 day Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) motion for extension of time applying the appellate rule's standard of good cause that is explicitly prescribed by Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)(A)(ii).

On March 7, 2024 the district court denied Appellant's timely 29 day Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) motion for extension of time showing good cause this Court's March 1, 2024 Court Order that affects Appellant's preparation of Appellant's Notice of Appeal.

Wrongly, the district court denied Appellant's timely 29 day Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) motion for extension of time filed on March 1, 2024 wrongly applying "excusable neglect" relying on "extraordinary circumstances."

Accordingly, Appellant filed with the district court clerk on Thursday, March 7, 2024, Appellant's motion for reconsideration and Appellant's Motion for Extension of Time pursuant to Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)(A)(i), Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), and Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)(C) moving the district court to apply the good cause standard because Appellant already filed on March 1st Appellant's timely Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5) Motion for Extension of time within **29 days**, that had **already shown good cause** that Appellant *required the 30 day extension to adequately review and consider this Appellate Court's March 1, 2024 Order that affects Appellant's preparation of Notice of Appeal.* For example, Paragraph one

(1) of Appellant's March 1, 2024 FRAP 4(a)(5) Motion clearly states as good cause that "Plaintiff only received the Appellate Court March 1, 2024 Court Order on the afternoon of March 1, 2024, and has not had an adequate opportunity to adequately review, consider or respond." *See*, ECF 49, first paragraph.

The district court docketed the Appellant's district court motion for reconsideration as ECF 53.

Appellant immediately filed here into this case her Response to the Court's March 1, 2024 Order again responding that the Appellant intends to file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal, and noticed the Court Appellant's filing in the district court the March 7, 2024 motion for reconsideration. (*See*, (Case: 23-1967 Document: 00118117753 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/07/2024 Entry ID: 6627688)

On Friday, March 8, 2024 the district court denied Appellant's March 7, 2024 motion for reconsideration (ECF 53) with a curt TEXT ORDER, saying the second denial is on the same basis as the district court's March 7, 2024 denial, again wrongly applying an "excusable neglect" standard by distorting the facts ramming "good cause" facts into distortions of reality "extraordinary circumstances."

At this juncture, Appellant can file a Notice of Appeal of the district court March 7th and 8th, 2024 denials, incorporating those orders into the final

judgment. However, Appellant respectfully reminds the Court that Judge Smith's post-appeal orders dated November 20, 2023, February 1, 2024, and the resulting March 7, 2024 and March 8, 2024 denial orders have already resulted in the creation of two appeal cases, Appeal No. 23-19667 and 23-1978. A third appeal case created under these circumstances is not in the interest of judicial economy.

Accordingly, Appellant respectfully files this motion for reconsideration before this Court, pursuant to a reading of the rules' texts under Fed. R. App. P 27(b), 26(b)(1) and 4(a)(5)(A).

Appellant in good faith and with diligence files in the district court a Fed. R. App. P 8(a)(1)(A) to stay the tolling of time to file Appellant's Notice of Appeal pending this Court's resolution of this herein motion for reconsideration. In so doing, in the interest of judicial economy, the Appellant in good faith affords the district court a third opportunity to reconsider its Fed. R. App. P 4 extension of time denials, prior to filing a Fed. R. App. P 8(a)(2) motion before this Court. Appellants is asking the district court to resolve Appellant's Fed. R. App. P 8(a)(1)(A) motion to stay today, on March 8, 2024, based on the district court's record of speedy two denials throughout this week.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, this Court should GRANT Appellant's herein motion to reconsider and extend the time to file Appellant's Notice of Appeal or amended Notice of Appeal to April 2, 2024.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: March 8, 2024

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the foregoing instrument has been served via the Court's ECF filing system on March 8, 2024, on all registered counsel of record, and has been transmitted to the Clerk of the Court.

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Exhibit A

**U.S. District Court
District of Rhode Island (Providence)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:23-cv-00126-WES-PAS**

Date Filed: 03/30/2023
Date Terminated: 10/19/2023
Jury Demand: Both
Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other
Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Mary Seguin

V.

represented by **Marissa D. Pizana**
RI Department of Attorney General
Civil Division
150 South Main Street
Providence, RI 02903
401-274-4400
Email: mpizana@riag.ri.gov
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

represented by **Marissa D. Pizana**
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

represented by **Joanna M. Achille**
Burns & Levinson LLP
1 Citizens Plaza
Providence, RI 02903
(401) 831-8330
Fax: (617) 345-3299
Email: jachille@burnslev.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

1

Michael D. Coleman

In his individual and official capacity

Defendant

Deborah A. Barclay

In her individual and official capacity

Defendant

Lisa Pinsoneault

In her individual and official capacity

Defendant

Carl Beauregard

In his individual and official capacity

Defendant

Kevin Tighe

Defendant

Monique Bonin

Defendant

Frank Dibiase

Defendant

Wendy A. Fobert

Defendant

Karla Caballeros

Defendant

Timothy Flynn

Defendant

Rhode Island Court System

Defendant

Paul A Suttell

*L in his individual and official capacity
as Executive Head OF Rhode Island State
Court System*

Defendant

**Rhode Island Administrative Office of
State Courts**

Defendant

**Rhode Island Administrative Office of
the Superior Court**

Defendant

Rhode Island Judicial Council

Defendant

Rhode Island Superior Court

Defendant

**Rhode Island Superior Court Judicial
Council**

Defendant

The Judicial Technology Center

Defendant

Julie Hamil

Defendant

Marisa P. Brown

Defendant

John Joseph Baxter, Jr.

Defendant

Justin Correa

Defendant

**Rhode Island Office of the Attorney
General**

Defendant

**Rhode Island Office of the Attorney
General Open Government Unit**

Defendant

Adam Roach

Defendant

Peter Neronha

Defendant

Tyler Technologies, Inc.

Date Filed	#	Docket Text
03/30/2023	<u>1</u>	COMPLAINT (filing fee paid \$ 402.00 receipt number ARIDC-1855567), filed by Mary Seguin.(DaCruz, Kayla) (Entered: 03/30/2023)
03/30/2023		CORRECTIVE DOCKET ENTRY Regarding: <u>1</u> Complaint. CORRECTIVE DOCKET ENTRY: This case has been electronically filed and processed, however, after a quality control review the following deficiencies were found: Civil Cover Sheet not attached . The filer is directed to file a Civil Cover Sheet within one day. (DaCruz, Kayla) (Entered: 03/30/2023)
03/30/2023	<u>2</u>	Civil Cover Sheet filed by Mary Seguin. Regarding New Case: <u>1</u> Complaint. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Email)(DaCruz, Kayla) (Entered: 03/30/2023)
03/30/2023	<u>3</u>	Summons Request filed by Mary Seguin. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Rhode Island Department of Human Services Office of Child Support Services Summons, # <u>2</u> Gero Meyersiek Summons)(DaCruz, Kayla) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/30/2023: # <u>3</u> Email) (DaCruz, Kayla). (Entered: 03/30/2023)
03/30/2023	<u>4</u>	MOTION for Leave to Proceed as Pro Se Electronic Filer filed by Mary Seguin. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Email)(DaCruz, Kayla) (Entered: 03/30/2023)
03/30/2023		CASE CONDITIONALLY ASSIGNED to District Judge William E. Smith and Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan. Related Case Number 23cv34 based upon a related case previously assigned to the presiding judge. The assignment is subject to the presiding judge's determination that the cases, in fact, are related. (DaCruz, Kayla) (Entered: 03/30/2023)
03/30/2023	<u>5</u>	CASE OPENING NOTICE ISSUED (DaCruz, Kayla) (Entered: 03/30/2023)
03/30/2023	<u>6</u>	Summons Issued as to Gero Meyersiek, Rhode Island Department of Human Services, Rhode Island Department of Human Services Office of Child Support Services. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Rhode Island Department of Human Services Office Of Child Support Services Summons, # <u>2</u> Gero Meyersiek Summons)(DaCruz, Kayla) (Entered: 03/30/2023)
03/30/2023		TEXT ORDER granting <u>4</u> Motion for Leave to Proceed as Pro Se Electronic Filer. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 3/30/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 03/30/2023)
07/07/2023	<u>7</u>	ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE entered. Show Cause Response due by 7/21/2023. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 7/7/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 07/07/2023)
07/07/2023		CASE PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED: Since District Judge William E. Smith has determined that this case is in fact related to CA 22-cv-34 this case is permanently assigned to District Judge William E. Smith for all further proceedings. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 07/07/2023)
07/20/2023	<u>8</u>	AFFIDAVIT re <u>7</u> Order to Show Cause <i>Rule 4(m) Show Cause Declaration</i> by Mary Seguin. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Exhibits A to B attached to Plaintiff's Rule 4(m) Show Cause Declaration)(Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 07/20/2023)
08/07/2023	<u>9</u>	NOTICE of Appearance by Marissa D. Pizana on behalf of Rhode Island Department of Human Services, Rhode Island Department of Human Services Office Of Child Support Services (Pizana, Marissa) (Entered: 08/07/2023)

08/07/2023	<u>10</u>	MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Answer re <u>1</u> Complaint <i>or Otherwise Respond to the Complaint</i> filed by Rhode Island Department of Human Services, Rhode Island Department of Human Services Office Of Child Support Services. Responses due by 8/21/2023. (Pizana, Marissa) (Entered: 08/07/2023)
08/07/2023	<u>11</u>	EXHIBIT IN SUPPORT by Rhode Island Department of Human Services, Rhode Island Department of Human Services Office Of Child Support Services in support of <u>10</u> MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Answer re <u>1</u> Complaint <i>or Otherwise Respond to the Complaint</i> . (Pizana, Marissa) (Entered: 08/07/2023)
08/08/2023	<u>12</u>	MOTION for an Extension of Time to Amend <u>1</u> Complaint <i>Pursuant to Rule 15</i> filed by Mary Seguin. Responses due by 8/22/2023. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Exhibit A to E attached to Plaintiff Motion for Extension of Time To Amend Complaint 080823, # <u>2</u> Affidavit Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff Motion for Extension of Time to Amend Complaint 080823, # <u>3</u> Exhibit Exhibit A to D attached to Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff Motion for Extension of Time to Amend Complaint 080823)(Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 08/08/2023)
08/10/2023	<u>13</u>	NOTICE of Appearance by Joanna M. Achille on behalf of Gero Meyersiek (Achille, Joanna) (Entered: 08/10/2023)
08/10/2023	<u>14</u>	First MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Answer re <u>1</u> Complaint filed by Gero Meyersiek. Responses due by 8/24/2023. (Achille, Joanna) (Entered: 08/10/2023)
08/15/2023		TEXT ORDER granting <u>10</u> Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Rhode Island Department of Human Services answer due 10/9/2023; Rhode Island Department of Human Services Office of Child Support Services answer due 10/9/2023. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 8/15/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 08/15/2023)
08/16/2023	<u>15</u>	RESPONSE In Opposition to <u>12</u> MOTION for an Extension of Time to Amend <u>1</u> Complaint <i>Pursuant to Rule 15</i> filed by Rhode Island Department of Human Services, Rhode Island Department of Human Services Office Of Child Support Services. Replies due by 8/23/2023. (Pizana, Marissa) (Entered: 08/16/2023)
08/16/2023	<u>16</u>	REPLY to Response re <u>15</u> Response to Motion, <i>Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Amend Complaint</i> filed by Mary Seguin. (Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 08/16/2023)
08/17/2023	<u>17</u>	MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Mary Seguin. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Supporting Memorandum Memorandum In Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, # <u>2</u> Affidavit Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff Motion for TRO, # <u>3</u> Exhibit Exhibits Attached to Plaintiff Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction)(Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 08/17/2023)
08/17/2023	<u>18</u>	AFFIDAVIT re <u>17</u> MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order <i>and Motion for Preliminary Injunction</i> by Mary Seguin. (Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 08/17/2023)
08/18/2023	<u>19</u>	AFFIDAVIT re <u>17</u> MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order <i>and Rule 65(a) Motion for Injunctive Relief</i> by Mary Seguin. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Rhode Island Family Court Emergency Motion to Stay Proceedings)(Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 08/18/2023)
08/18/2023	<u>20</u>	EXHIBIT IN SUPPORT by Mary Seguin in support of <u>18</u> Affidavit, <u>17</u> MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order , <u>1</u> Complaint, <u>19</u> Affidavit <i>Affidavit in Support of Evidence Submitted for Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.</i> (Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 08/18/2023)

08/18/2023	<u>21</u>	EXHIBIT IN SUPPORT by Mary Seguin in support of <u>1</u> Complaint . (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Documentary Evidentiary Support, # <u>2</u> Exhibit Evidentiary Support, # <u>3</u> Exhibit Evidentiary Support, # <u>4</u> Exhibit Evidentiary Support, # <u>5</u> Exhibit Evidentiary Support, # <u>6</u> Exhibit Evidentiary Support, # <u>7</u> Exhibit Audio Recording Evidentiary Support)(Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 08/18/2023)
08/18/2023	<u>22</u>	DOCKET NOTE: Audio file was received and will be maintained in the Clerk's Office. Regarding: <u>20</u> Exhibit in Support, <u>21</u> Exhibit in Support, <u>18</u> Affidavit, <u>17</u> MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order , <u>1</u> Complaint, <u>19</u> Affidavit. (Kenny, Meghan) (Entered: 08/18/2023)
08/18/2023	<u>23</u>	Emergency MOTION for Hearing re <u>17</u> MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Mary Seguin. Responses due by 9/1/2023. (Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 08/18/2023)
08/18/2023	<u>24</u>	Second MOTION for Hearing re <u>17</u> MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Mary Seguin. Responses due by 9/1/2023. (Kenny, Meghan) (Entered: 08/18/2023)
08/18/2023		TEXT ORDER denying Plaintiff's <u>17</u> Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Because the ongoing proceedings in state court implicate a significant state interest, the Younger abstention doctrine applies, requiring this Court to abstain from enjoining ongoing state proceedings. <u>See Younger v. Harris</u> , 401 U.S. 37 (1971); <u>Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie</u> , 794 F.3d 185, 191–93 (1st Cir. 2015). The ongoing proceeding in Family Court implicates the State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts and in its ability to collect child support payments, the state court is fully competent to adjudicate Plaintiff's claims, and no <u>Younger</u> abstention exceptions apply. <u>See Sirva</u> , 794 F.3d at 192. Accordingly, Plaintiff's <u>17</u> Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 8/18/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 08/18/2023)
08/18/2023		TEXT ORDER granting Plaintiff's <u>12</u> Motion for an Extension of Time to Amend Complaint and Defendant Gero Meyersiek's <u>14</u> First Motion for an Extension of Time to File Answer. Because Defendants have not yet filed a responsive pleading, Plaintiff is permitted to amend her Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Plaintiff is directed to file her amended complaint within fourteen days from the date of this order. In light of this extension, Defendant Gero Meyersieks request for an extension of time is also granted, and he is directed to respond to Plaintiff's amended complaint within 60 days of its filing. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 8/18/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 08/18/2023)
08/18/2023		TEXT ORDER denying Plaintiff's <u>23</u> Emergency Motion for Hearing and <u>24</u> Second Motion for Hearing. In light of the denial of Plaintiff's <u>17</u> Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff's requests for a hearing on that motion are DENIED as MOOT. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 8/18/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 08/18/2023)
09/01/2023	<u>25</u>	AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Mary Seguin.(Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 09/01/2023)
09/05/2023	<u>26</u>	NOTICE by Mary Seguin <i>Notice and Demand of Claims Against Defendants' Liability Insurance Policies and Coverage</i> (Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 09/05/2023)
09/06/2023	<u>27</u>	MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Answer re <u>25</u> Amended Complaint filed by Rhode Island Department of Human Services, Rhode Island Department of Human

		Services Office Of Child Support Services. Responses due by 9/20/2023. (Pizana, Marissa) (Entered: 09/06/2023)
09/08/2023	<u>28</u>	RESPONSE In Opposition to <u>27</u> MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Answer re <u>25</u> Amended Complaint filed by Mary Seguin. Replies due by 9/15/2023. (Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 09/08/2023)
09/19/2023		TEXT ORDER granting <u>27</u> Motion for an Extension of Time to File Answer. Rhode Island Department of Human Services' answer is due November 17, 2023; Rhode Island Department of Human Services Office of Child Support Services' answer is due November 17, 2023. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 9/19/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 09/19/2023)
09/30/2023	<u>29</u>	First MOTION for Recusal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 filed by Mary Seguin. Responses due by 10/16/2023. (Seguin, Mary) (Entered: 09/30/2023)
10/02/2023		TEXT ORDER denying Plaintiff's <u>29</u> Motion for Recusal. Plaintiff "moves to recuse and/or disqualify" me and "all justices, judges, or magistrate judges... in the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island." A judge may be disqualified from a case if "(1) the judges impartiality may reasonably be questioned; or (2) the judge may have a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party." <u>United States v. Kelley</u> , 712 F.2d 884, 889 (1st Cir. 1983); <u>see</u> 28 U.S.C. § 455. Plaintiff argues that I and the other judges of this Court should disqualify ourselves because we did so <u>sua sponte</u> in her past lawsuits. Plaintiff does not identify any other facts to support her argument that I should recuse myself from this case. Plaintiffs argument is plainly insufficient to justify recusal and disqualification. <u>See United States v. Houston</u> , No. 3:13-10-DCR, 2013 WL 3975405, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. July 29, 2013) ("A judges recusal in a prior case does not alone require disqualification in a subsequent case."). Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for Recusal is DENIED. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 10/2/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 10/02/2023)
10/17/2023	<u>30</u>	Summons Request filed by Mary Seguin. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Summons Request, # <u>2</u> Summons Request)(Kenny, Meghan) (Entered: 10/17/2023)
10/19/2023		TEXT ORDER dismissing the action under <u>Younger</u> abstention. Though not raised by the parties, the Court has the power and obligation to dismiss an action if the principles of abstention so require. <u>See Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez</u> , 585 F.3d 508, 517-18 (1st Cir. 2009); <u>see also Bellotti v. Baird</u> , 428 U.S. 132, 14344 n.10 (1976) (recognizing that "abstention may be raised by the court sua sponte"). Plaintiff filed a 91-page Amended Complaint asking the Court to address the child support payments for which she alleges she is being wrongfully charged and her perceived grievance that she is being denied access to court records under the Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act ("APRA"). <u>See generally</u> Am. Compl., ECF No. <u>25</u> . Plaintiff seeks to impede both the child support proceedings before the Rhode Island Family Court ("Family Court") and her action before the Rhode Island Superior Court ("Superior Court") concerning her alleged denial of access to court records. The telltale signs that Plaintiff is attempting to encumber state court proceedings are the facts that Plaintiff, in her Amended Complaint, included as parties, among others, the Superior Court, various state court clerks, and the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court; Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to "enjoin[] and restrain[] the Defendants from continuing prosecution of the family court proceeding against the Plaintiff," Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. 16, ECF No. <u>17</u> ; and Plaintiff asked the Court, in her Amended Complaint, to "[e]njoin the Defendants[]" enforcement and practices of rules, practices, and/or policies" of the state courts, Am.

Compl. 90. The issues being considered before the Family Court directly relate to this case because, according to the Amended Complaint, Defendant Rhode Island Department of Human Services ("RIDHS") is seeking child support arrearage interest from Plaintiff. See Am. Compl. ¶ 135–37 (recognizing that RIDHS is seeking compound interest). Moreover, Plaintiff admits that she has a pending case before the Superior Court where she alleges violations of the APRA. See Am. Compl. ¶ 2; see also Seguin v. R.I. Dept of Human Servs., PC–2022–07215 (R.I. Super. Ct.). The Court takes judicial notice of the proceedings before both state tribunals. See Meyersiek v. Seguin, K–2001–0521M (R.I. Fam. Ct.); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (permitting, "at any stage of the proceeding," sua sponte judicial notice of facts "not subject to reasonable dispute because" they "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned"). The Younger abstention doctrine, derived from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), "counsels federal–court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding." Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). For the doctrine to apply, certain elements must be met. "First, the pending state [court] proceeding must fall into one of three categories: 1) criminal prosecutions, 2) civil proceedings that are 'akin to criminal prosecutions' ('quasi–criminal proceedings') or 3) civil proceedings that 'implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.'" Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Healey, 544 F. Supp. 3d 139, 143 (D. Mass. 2021) (quoting Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 2015)). Here, relief for Plaintiff in the pending Family Court case would implicate the state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts concerning the payment and collection of child support. See Seguin v. Bedrosian, No. 12–cv–614–JD, 2013 WL 367722, at *2 (D.R.I. Jan. 30, 2013). Moreover, the state has an asserted interest in having appeals under the APRA be heard before the Superior Court. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38–2–9. Second, the state court case must satisfy the factors identified in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982): "1) the state proceeding is ongoing, 2) it involves significant state interests and 3) it provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise his federal claims in state court." Credit Acceptance Corp., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 143; see also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. The first factor is satisfied because the proceedings are ongoing. The second factor is satisfied because the state has an interest in family relations and the payment and collection of child support, see Eastman v. New Hampshire, No. 11–cv–316–SM, 2012 WL 405487, at *3 (D.N.H. Jan. 17, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11–cv–316–SM, 2012 WL 405507 (D.N.H. Feb. 8, 2012), and an interest in the "fair and orderly administration of justice" that includes maintaining sensitive and confidential judicial records, see Courthouse News Serv. v. Quinlan, 32 F.4th 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2022). As for the third factor, "[e]xcept in the most extraordinary cases, a federal court must presume that state courts, consistent with the imperatives of the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. Const. art. VI, are fully competent to adjudicate federal constitutional and statutory claims properly presented by the parties." Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 1993) (footnote omitted). Nothing suggests that the Family Court and the Superior Court cannot hear Plaintiff's federal claims. Third, none of the Younger abstention exceptions apply. See Sirva, 794 F.3d at 192 (finding abstention inappropriate if 1) the state proceeding is brought "in bad faith" to harass, 2) the state forum cannot adequately protect federal rights, or 3) the state statute is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions" (citations omitted)). Accordingly, because the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's case, it is DISMISSED in its entirety. Because Plaintiff has a history of filing frivolous and repetitive motions following decisions of the Court of which she disapproves, see Seguin v. R.I. Office of Child Support Servs., No. 1:23–cv–00034–WES–PAS

		(D.R.I.), it is further ORDERED that the Courts March 30, 2023, Text Order granting Plaintiff Leave to Proceed as a Pro Se Electronic Filer is VACATED. Plaintiff's Electronic Filer privileges are revoked. See LR Gen 302(b). So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 10/19/2023. (Simoncelli, Michael) (Entered: 10/19/2023)
10/19/2023	<u>31</u>	JUDGMENT. So Ordered by Clerk of Court on 10/19/2023. (Simoncelli, Michael) (Entered: 10/19/2023)
11/17/2023		TEXT ORDER: The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff's two recent emails to the Clerk's Office. The Court construes these emails as motions for leave to file the motions attached to those emails and denies leave to file for the reasons given in its earlier text orders. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 11/17/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) Modified on 11/17/2023 to correct a typo. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra). (Entered: 11/17/2023)
11/17/2023		TEXT ORDER: The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff's email to the Clerk's Office this afternoon. As with its order issued earlier today, the Court construes this email as a motion for leave to file the motion attached to the email and denies leave to file for the reasons given in its earlier text orders. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 11/17/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra) (Entered: 11/17/2023)
11/17/2023	<u>32</u>	NOTICE OF APPEAL by Mary Seguin as to Text Order, Text Order, NOTICE TO COUNSEL: Counsel should register for a First Circuit CM/ECF Appellate Filer Account at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/cmecf/. Counsel should also review the First Circuit requirements for electronic filing by visiting the CM/ECF Information section at http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cmecf Appeal Record due by 11/24/2023. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Envelope)(Kenny, Meghan) (Entered: 11/17/2023)

Form 1A

Notice of Appeal to a Court of Appeals From a Judgment of a District Court

United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island
Docket Number 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

MARY SEGUIN, Plaintiff

v.

Notice of Appeal

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES in its
official capacity; MICHAEL D.
COLEMAN, DEBORAH A.
BARCLAY in their individual and
official capacities;
RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF
CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its
official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE,
MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK
DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT,
KARLA CABALLEROS,
TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA
PINSONNEAULT, CARL
BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA
GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS,
PAUL GOULD, in their individual
and official capacities; RHODE
ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM
in its official capacity; PAUL A.
SUTTELL in his individual and
official capacity as EXECUTIVE
HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND
STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE
ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its
official capacity; RHODE ISLAND
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE SUPERIOR COURT in its
official capacity; RHODE ISLAND
JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official
capacity; RHODE ISLAND
SUPERIOR COURT in its official

capacity; RHODE ISLAND
SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL
COUNCIL in its official capacity;
THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY
CENTER in its official capacity;
JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN,
JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR.,
JUSTIN CORREA in their
individual and official capacities;
RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL in its
official capacity; RHODE ISLAND
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT
UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM
D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in
their official and individual
capacities; TYLER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO
MEYERSIEK, Defendants

MARY SEGUIN (name all parties taking the appeal)* appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the FIRST Circuit from the final judgment entered on October 19, 2023 (state the date the judgment was entered).

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 17, 2023

* See Rule 3(c) for permissible ways of identifying appellants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

PLAINTIFF’S DOCKETING STATEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT AND THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

1. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se from and as a citizen of Texas, respectfully states to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the United States District Court of the District of Rhode Island that this case is related to the pending appellate case, *Mary Seguin v. Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services, et al*, Case Number 23-1851.

2. Plaintiff respectfully requests the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to review Plaintiff's timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion that were filed in the U.S. District Court of the District of Rhode Island on November 16, 2023 as proper part of the record of appeal. Prior to filing this Notice of Appeal, Plaintiff also filed a Rule 60(b)(1) Motion regarding the District Court's interference with Plaintiff's right to file Rule 59 and Rule 60 post judgment in which Plaintiff sought to preserve issues for appeal on the record. Plaintiff attaches all relevant documentation, including all relevant emails to the Clerk of the Court of the District Court and Plaintiff's properly filed post judgment motions pursuant to Rule 59 and Rule 60 herein to this Notice of Appeal and Docket Statement.
3. Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion was filed on November 16, 2023, which the District Court of Rhode Island refused to docket on the record, pursuant to instructions by Judge Smith.
4. Plaintiff's first Rule 60 Motion was filed on November 16, 2023, which the District Court of Rhode Island refused to docket on the record, pursuant to instructions by Judge Smith.
5. Plaintiff attaches the aforesaid post judgment Motions and requests appellate review under these extraordinary and troubling factual circumstances that violate and obstruct the fundamental First Amendment right of access to the Court of Record, due process and obstruction to justice in the First Circuit, and *inter alia*, interference with the accuracy of the court's record for appeal in this matter.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 16, 2023, I filed the within Motion with the Clerk of the Court via email.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 17, 2023



Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 60(b)(1) MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>
Draft

Fri, Nov 17, 2023 at 1:38 PM

Dear Clerks of the Court,

I spoke with Clerk Meghan today regarding an update on the docketing of my motions.

Following our discussion, I respectfully request the Clerk of the Court to docket today my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion, dated November 17, 2023, that is time-sensitive.

Please make sure that my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion is docketed as ECF 32.

Please make sure that the law is followed that my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion is NOT forwarded to Chambers prior to docketing. I am NOT requesting the Court leave to file, since it is my right to file the attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion. No Chamber interference should be taking place to prevent the docketing of my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion.

Thank you for your assistance.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Seguin
Houston, Texas

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Mary Seguin** <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

Date: Fri, Nov 17, 2023 at 12:33 PM

Subject: Fwd: URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 59 MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Dear Clerks of the Court,

I am respectfully following up on my Rule 59 Motion filing.

Yesterday, November 16, 2023, at 1:31 PM Central Time, I filed via email below, my Rule 59 Motion in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS. As indicated in my email below, I emphasized that docketing the Rule 59 Motion on November 16, 2023 is urgent, to comply with the 28 day filing post-judgment deadline, which my filing meets - November 16, 2023 is within the 28 day deadline of Fed. R. of Civ. P. 59 that tolls the time for filing an appeal.

I followed up with telephone calls to the Clerk's Office at 1:32 PM Central Time, and at 3:42 PM Central Time to request timely docket of my Rule 59 Motion, and the Clerk's Office assured me each time that a deputy clerk is working on it and that it will be docketed on the day it was received and that the docket will reflect the email date stamp of the day the Rule 59 Motion is received by email. Further, I was told that **all filings** I email to the Clerk's Office will be docketed and considered by the Court as having been filed on the day that the motion was emailed to the Clerk's Office.

Therefore, my Rule 59 Motion emailed on November 16, 2023 should be accordingly docketed as **ECF 32** with the **entry of/stating filing on November 16, 2023**, in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

However, as of this time, on November 17, 2023 almost 24 hours later, my Rule 59 Motion is still not docketed.

I would like to respectfully clarify that the Text Order dated October 19, 2023 in this matter states that only my electronic filing privilege was revoked, but there is **no** order requiring that I need to file for leave of Court to file any post-judgment motions, such as my Rule 59 Motion.

Today, November 17, 2023, I telephoned the Clerk's Office first thing at 8:00 AM Central Time, and spoke with Clerk Meghan, who informed me that yesterday she had forwarded my Rule 59 Motion to Chambers upon receipt, but has yet to hear back from Chambers, but did not know what was causing the hold up when I asked why Chambers' response is taking almost 24 hours which impacts the docketing date of the Rule 59 Motion. I expressed my concern of the Rule 59 deadline, emphasizing that it tolls the time for filing an appeal, therefore I respectfully requested that the docket accurately reflects my timely filing of my Rule 59 Motion on November 16, 2023 (at 1:31 PM Central Time).

Additionally, I informed Clerk Meghan that I relied on the Clerk's Office's information provided above, and I had also filed a timely **Rule 60 Motion** yesterday, **November 16, 2023, at 4:39 PM Central Time**, similarly requesting docketing to reflect it was timely filed via email to on November 16, 2023. I emphasized to Clerk Meghan that timeliness is critical, as Rule 60 Motion filed within 28 days post-judgment tolls the time for filing an appeal. Clerk Meghan told me that my Rule 60 Motion was forwarded to Chambers as well. According to the Clerk's Office's information, my **Rule 60 Motion** needs to be docketed/filed as **ECF 33, dated stamped filed on November 16, 2023**.

Due to the above information regarding the processing of my post-judgment motions, I expressed to Clerk Meghan my concern regarding the Court's procedure of forwarding my time-sensitive post-judgment motions to Chambers without docketing/filing, and then those time-sensitive motions seemingly to languish in Chambers past the date of the 28-day deadline stipulated by Rule 59, and Rule 60 as they relate to tolling the time for filing an appeal. I expressed my explicit concern that I seek to preserve my right of appeal, and that I respectfully seek to preserve on the record the issues contained in my Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions that are currently before Chambers, without docketing, by law within the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island. My Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions are not ex-parte or emergency motions.

Moreover, I expressed to Clerk Meghan my concern that the processing of my post-judgment motions forwarded to Chambers and seemingly pending before Chambers without the motions being docketed, impacts my right of appeal 30-days post judgment, and today, Friday, is Day 29. I told the Clerk that under the circumstances in this matter, I seek to preserve for appeal the issues raised in my timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion, and that I seek to preserve my right to appeal within the 30-day postjudgment period.

I also discussed with the Clerk that my timely filed but undocketed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion that were forwarded to and currently before Chambers cause an uncertain effect, impacting the date of my filing of Notice of Appeal, the deadline of which is November 18, 2023, a Saturday. Based on the current facts and issues regarding simply docketing my filings on the record, I am concerned my rights of access to the Courts are impacted, and that my Notice of Appeal may also languish I do not believe any pro se litigant should be made to be uncertain of the timeliness of filing a Notice of Appeal as a matter of right that is caused by inaction by Chambers on timely-filed Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions that toll the time to file an appeal. I explicitly expressed my concern on the effect on my access to the Courts.

I respectfully request that this email communication regarding the filing/docketing of my Rule 59 Motion be docketed to accurately reflect the record on appeal along with the Rule 59 Motion at the time the Rule 59 Motion is docketed by the Clerk.

Thank you in advance for you assistance.

Respectfully submitted,
Mary Seguin

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Mary Seguin** <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

Date: Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 1:31 PM

Subject: URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 59 MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Dear Clerk of the Court,

Kindly urgently file today, November 16, 2023, my attached Rule 59 Motion in the above captioned case, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

Because this Rule 59 Motion is time sensitive, kindly make sure that it is filed and docketed today, November 16, 2023. I do not have access to electronic filing, it appears.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Seguin
PO Box 22022
Houston, TX 77019
(281) 244-2016



CA 126 Rule 60(b)(1) Motion with Attachments FINAL 111723.pdf
679K

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(b)(1) MOTION

1. Plaintiff, proceeding from and as a citizen of Texas, respectfully requests pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (4) and (6) for a new trial. Judge Smith had obstructed Plaintiff access to the Court, by instructing the Clerk of the Court, Meghan, to not docket Plaintiff's timely filed Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions filed with the Clerk via email on November 16, 2023, as to obstruct Plaintiff's right to access the Court to preserve the issues for appeal. Plaintiff avers the following, supported by affidavit attached:

(1) On November 16, 2023, at 1:31 PM Central Time, Plaintiff filed via email to the Office of the Clerk In-Take email, Plaintiff's timely-filed Rule 59 Motion, requesting a new trial as Rule 59(e) provides. Plaintiff requested in her email that the Clerk timely docket the time-sensitive Rule 59 Motion on November 16, 2023. Plaintiff telephoned the Clerk's Office twice on November 16, 2023 to make sure of the Clerk's receipt of Plaintiff's filings, and was confirmed, and told that all motions emailed to the Clerk's Office are docketed as filed on the date stamp receipt by the Court's Clerk's Office. See attached email and email-attached Motion.

(2) On November 16, 2023, at 4:39 PM Central Time, Plaintiff filed via email to the Office of the Clerk In-Take email, Plaintiff's timely-filed Rule 60(b) Motion, requesting a new trial. Plaintiff requested in her email that the Clerk timely docket the time-sensitive Rule 60 Motion on November 16, 2023. See attached email and email-attached Motion.

(3) However, neither motions were docketed by the Clerk of the Court, and Plaintiff followed up first thing on November 17, 2023 at 8:00 AM Central Time. Plaintiff spoke to Clerk Meghan who informed Plaintiff that she had forwarded Plaintiff's Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motion to Chambers because the Court told her to, without docketing Plaintiff's Motions. Clerk Meghan told Plaintiff she will email Chambers to "find out what is going on." No Order in this matter requires Plaintiff to file for leave of Court to file any post judgement motions, and even if leave is required, Plaintiff's court-submitted Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions seeking to preserve issues for appeal are required by law to be docketed in all courts of law to complete an accurate record for appeal.

(4) Plaintiff expressed to Clerk Meghan Plaintiff's concern that the irregular forwarding of timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion languishing in Chambers without being docketed on the record adversely impede and obstruct Plaintiff's right of access to the Court, as

well as obstructs Plaintiff's right to preserve legal issues for appeal, and fabricating an inaccurate record for appeal, as well as violates due process.

(5) At 12:20 PM, Plaintiff followed up by telephone, and was told that there were no updates from Chambers and Plaintiff's Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions are still not docketed. Plaintiff emailed the Clerk's office documenting in writing the irregularity described above. At the very same moment, Judge Smith entered a text order stating that the Court is in receipt of two emails sent by the Plaintiff and construes them as motion for leave to file, that are denied. Plaintiff's Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions continue to be not docketed. Plaintiff phoned the Office of the Clerk again, and the Clerk informed Plaintiff that the Court is telling her not to docket Plaintiff's Rule 59 and Rule 60 motions. This is *prima facie* judicial obstruction of Plaintiff's right to file Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions against the Plaintiff to preserve issues on the record for appeal. Plaintiff attaches herewith the aforesaid November 17, 2023 email for the record.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the Court to docket Plaintiff's timely filed Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions and the aforesaid three emails to preserve the record accurately. Plaintiff requests the Court treat Plaintiff's timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion filed on November 16, 2023 as timely filed. Plaintiff requests the disqualification of Judge Smith by the Court. Plaintiff requests any and all such relief deemed just under the circumstances.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 17, 2023, I filed the within Motion with the Clerk of the Court via email.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 17, 2023



Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 59 MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

2 messages

Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>
To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 1:31 PM

Dear Clerk of the Court,

Kindly urgently file today, November 16, 2023, my attached Rule 59 Motion in the above captioned case, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

Because this Rule 59 Motion is time sensitive, kindly make sure that it is filed and docketed today, November 16, 2023. I do not have access to electronic filing, it appears.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Seguin
PO Box 22022
Houston, TX 77019
(281) 244-2016

 **CA 126 Plaintiff Rule 59 Motion with Affidavit 111623.pdf**
387K

Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>
To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Fri, Nov 17, 2023 at 12:33 PM

Dear Clerks of the Court,

I am respectfully following up on my Rule 59 Motion filing.

Yesterday, November 16, 2023, at 1:31 PM Central Time, I filed via email below, my Rule 59 Motion in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS. As indicated in my email below, I emphasized that docketing the Rule 59 Motion on November 16, 2023 is urgent, to comply with the 28 day filing post-judgment deadline, which my filing meets - November 16, 2023 is within the 28 day deadline of Fed. R. of Civ. P. 59 that tolls the time for filing an appeal.

I followed up with telephone calls to the Clerk's Office at 1:32 PM Central Time, and at 3:42 PM Central Time to request timely docket of my Rule 59 Motion, and the Clerk's Office assured me each time that a deputy clerk is working on it and that it will be docketed on the day it was received and that the docket will reflect the email date stamp of the day the Rule 59 Motion is received by email. Further, I was told that **all filings** I email to the Clerk's Office will be docketed and considered by the Court as having been filed on the day that the motion was emailed to the Clerk's Office.

Therefore, my Rule 59 Motion emailed on November 16, 2023 should be accordingly docketed as **ECF 32** with the **entry of/stating filing on November 16, 2023**, in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

However, as of this time, on November 17, 2023 almost 24 hours later, my Rule 59 Motion is still not docketed.

I would like to respectfully clarify that the Text Order dated October 19, 2023 in this matter states that only my electronic filing privilege was revoked, but there is no order requiring that I need to file for leave of Court to file any post-judgment motions, such as my Rule 59 Motion.

Today, November 17, 2023, I telephoned the Clerk's Office regarding at 8:00 AM Central Time, and spoke with Clerk Meghan, who informed me that yesterday she had forwarded my Rule 59 Motion to Chambers upon receipt, but has yet to hear back from Chambers, but did not know what was causing the hold up when I asked why Chambers' response is taking almost 24 hours which impacts the docketing date of the Rule 59 Motion. I expressed my concern of the Rule 59 deadline, emphasizing that it tolls the time for filing an appeal, therefore I respectfully requested that the docket accurately reflects my timely filing of my Rule 59 Motion on November 16, 2023 (at 1:31 PM Central Time).

Additionally, I informed Clerk Meghan that I relied on the Clerk's Office's information provided above, and I had also filed a timely **Rule 60** Motion yesterday, **November 16, 2023**, at **4:39 PM Central Time**, similarly requesting docketing to reflect it was timely filed via email to on November 16, 2023. I emphasized to Clerk Meghan that timeliness is critical, as Rule 60 Motion filed within 28 days post-judgment tolls the time for filing an appeal. Clerk Meghan told me that my Rule 60 Motion was forwarded to Chambers as well. According to the Clerk's Office's information, my **Rule 60 Motion** needs to be docketed/filed as **ECF 33, dated stamped filed on November 16, 2023**.

Due to the above information regarding the processing of my post-judgment motions, I expressed to Clerk Megghan my concern regarding the Court's procedure of forwarding my time-sensitive post-judgment motions to Chambers without docketing/filing, and then those time-sensitive motions seemingly to languish in Chambers past the date of the 28-day deadline stipulated by Rule 59, and Rule 60 as they relate to tolling the time for filing an appeal. I expressed my explicit concern that I seek to preserve my right of appeal, and that I respectfully seek to preserve on the record the issues contained in my Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions that are currently before Chambers, without docketing, by law within the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island. My Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions are not ex-parte or emergency motions.

Moreover, I expressed to Clerk Meghan my concern that the processing of my post-judgment motions forwarded to Chambers and seemingly pending before Chambers without the motions being docketed, impacts my right of appeal 30-days post judgment, and today, Friday, is Day 29. I told the Clerk that under the circumstances in this matter, I seek to preserve for appeal the issues raised in my timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion, and that I seek to preserve my right to appeal within the 30-day postjudgment period.

I also discussed with the Clerk that my timely filed but undocketed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion that were forwarded to and currently before Chambers cause an uncertain effect, impacting the date of my filing of Notice of Appeal, the deadline of which is November 18, 2023, a Saturday. Based on the current facts and issues regarding simply docketing my filings on the record, I am concerned my rights of access to the Courts are impacted, and that my Notice of Appeal may also languish I do not believe any pro se litigant should be made to be uncertain of the timeliness of filing a Notice of Appeal as a matter of right that is caused by inaction by Chambers on timely-filed Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions that toll the time to file an appeal. I explicitly expressed my concern on the effect on my access to the Courts.

I respectfully request that this email communication regarding the filing/docketing of my Rule 59 Motion be docketed to accurately reflect the record on appeal along with the Rule 59 Motion at the time the Rule 59 Motion is docketed by the Clerk.

Thank you in advance for you assistance.

Respectfully submitted,
Mary Sequin

[Quoted text hidden]

 CA 126 Plaintiff Rule 59 Motion with Affidavit 111623.pdf
387K



Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 60 MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

1 message

Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com> Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 4:39 PM
To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Dear Clerk/Deputy Clerk of the Court,

Kindly urgently file and docket today, November 16, 2023, my attached Rule 60(b) Motion in the above captioned case, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

Because this Rule 60(b) Motion is time sensitive, kindly make sure that it is filed and docketed today, November 16, 2023. I do not have access to electronic filing, it appears.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Seguin
PO Box 22022
Houston, TX 77019
(281) 244-2016

 **CA 126 Rule 60(b) Motion with Affidavit 111623.pdf**
379K

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

1. Plaintiff, proceeding from and as a citizen of Texas, respectfully requests pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 59 for a new trial. Plaintiff avers the following, supported by affidavit attached: The 91-page First Amended Complaint [ECF 25] filed on September 1, 2023 seeks monetary damages against the Rhode Island State Defendants and the private actor Defendants for:

(1) The Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' monopoly of publication of law.

(2) The Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' denial to the Public and to all Pro Se Litigants all access and the denial of free access to the contents of the law created, authored, and deliberated by the Rhode Island Judiciary.

(3) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies to knowingly fail to properly integrate the legacy electronic court case management systems used by Rhode Island Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services during the implementation of Odyssey from 2013 to 2014 (the State's official electronic court filing and electronic case management system), so that these state agencies' filings are discriminately invisible only to the Public, to Pro Se Litigants and to the Rhode Island Virtual Clerk of the Courts in the Rhode Island Family Court, a limited jurisdiction court of record. The State's filings are only visible to the judges and to the State filers, thus manipulating the proceeding towards a foregone conclusion in favor of the State filers.

(4) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies to misrepresent to the Public and to the Pro Se Litigants that the implemented electronic court case records of judge created laws are available to *all* court users, in order to cover up their monopolization of the publication of law denies the Public and the Pro Se Litigant access to the judge-created laws.

(5) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services that the State routinely establishes and enforces 12% compound interest on child and spousal support in Title IV of the Social Security Act state family court proceedings, in violation of the uniform statutory requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and

if the State opts to do so, between 3% to 6% *simple interest*, not 12% compound interest, targeting noncustodial parents victims. In welfare cases, support are assigned by the custodial parent to the State, and the 12% compound interest represents a fee for the State's "services" in the support's establishment and enforcement paid to the State, which at 12% compound interest represents lucrative, illegally obtained revenue to the State actors, who are financially incentivized to obtain as much as possible.

(6) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services and Tyler Technologies to knowingly fail to properly integrate Odyssey with the State's legacy electronic court filing system resulting in the State's filings seeking illegal 12% compound interest, as well as to deny the Public and to Pro Se Litigants' access to their publication of judge-created law records for the purpose of cover up of this wholesale illegal defraud of the court, extortionary defraud under color of state law targeting the unsuspecting noncustodial parents victims, and defraud of the United States (66% of the cost of these child support "operations" is funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services through Title IV of the Social Security Act through funds appropriated by Congress through the annual budget appropriations.)

(7) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Tyler Technologies to operate the Title IV Program of the Social Security Act in all manners violative of due process, in prima facie due process violative State Electronic Courts, for the purpose of generating state revenue through fraud and deceit, through conspired tortious interference of rights of access to the courts, rights of

access to state case documents, and rights of access to judge-created laws targeting litigants, targeting the Public and targeting Pro Se Litigants.

(8) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Tyler Technologies to cover up their public-access-denied publication of state judge-created laws of illegal 12% compound interest benefiting the state's revenue by adopting a State policy not to establish nor enforce any interest in *interstate* support cases only, calculated to cover up the collective fraud from federal enforcement officials and other states' enforcement officials of court orders (laws) showing 12% compounded interest established and funded under Title IV that are facially illegally violative of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) which explicitly provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and *if* the State opts to do so, between 3% to 6% *simple interest*, not 12% compound interest. The federal Title IV Program regulation by Congressional intent explicitly preempts any related state laws of all participating states.

(9) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services and Barbara Grady and Gero Meyersiek to use the fraudulent, First Amendment-, Fourth Amendment-, Fifth Amendment-, Seventh Amendment-, and Fourteenth Amendment violative state court machinery weaponizing Title IV Program of the Social Security Act to target the Plaintiff *pro se* noncustodial parent in Texas to retaliate against Plaintiff for her past lawsuits against them, namely ten years ago in Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013), in which Plaintiff sued them, *inter alia*, for monetary damages claims for extortion by the Rhode Island state

court's under color of state law abuse of the legal frame work of another federal-funded human services program Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, through which Rhode Island demanded that Plaintiff pay the state court actor \$55,000.00 per visitation if Plaintiff wanted to see her children in Rhode Island, because the state court stated in writing they believed Plaintiff married "a rich oil man" in Texas, absent any other legally sufficient basis. Plaintiff had reported this *prima facie* extortion under color of state law and under color of federal law 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, to the federal law enforcement authorities, *e.g.*, the F.B.I. in Texas and the Office of the U.S.

Department of Justice in Texas. Here, Plaintiff's **retaliation** damages claims have been issues pending before the Court since September 1, 2023 [ECF 25], at which point Judge Smith was disqualified under the self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. § 455, additionally given the fact Judge Smith had also self-recused from Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013) ten years ago. *See In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[under §455] the judge is expected to recuse sua sponte, where necessary, even if no party has requested it”).

(10) The Rhode Island Judiciary continues the pattern of cover up by denying Plaintiff's request for public judicial records related to the monopoly of publication of judge-created records submitted to the State Judiciary pursuant to the Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act ("RI APRA").

4. Plaintiff obtained new evidence on October 6, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary is a former client of Judge Smith, and on November 9, 2023, Plaintiff obtained new evidence that the

Rhode Island Judiciary remains a major client of Judge Smith's former law firm. Plaintiff's due diligence search for conflict of interest has been impeded by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies monopoly of publication of judge-created laws in the state's electronic court system and their denial of access to the judge-created laws, and Plaintiff, as a member of the Public and proceeding pro se without a Rhode Island Attorney license, the issuance of which is also monopolized by the Rhode Island Judiciary, has further been denied access to official records, including through the Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act, consistent with a pattern of civil conspiracy cover up.

5. A new trial or a stay of the Judgment is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Plaintiff, and to Americans across the First Circuit who would be needlessly deprived of access to the federal courts of law in the First Circuit for monetary damages redress - the judicially created doctrine of Younger Abstention that functioned as a court of equity - regarding Plaintiff's monetary damages claims against the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' scheme to monopolize the publication of judge-created laws that denies, tortiously interferes, tortiously abridges and tortiously obstruct the Public access to those very laws; regarding Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services' unlawful seizures of interstate Texas properties outside of Rhode Island under color of Rhode Island state law based on legally insufficient interest charge on overdue support based on the unlawful rate of 12% compound interest that is disallowed under Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and *if* the State opts to do so, between 3% to 6% *simple interest*, *not* 12% compound interest. And this is on top of Defendants' breach of contract that was brokered by Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services on behalf of the agency's client; the contract between the custodial parent client, defendant Gero

Meyersiek and the Texas Plaintiff stipulated that the custodial parent waived interest upon the Texas Plaintiff paying a lump sum of \$104,185.98 pay-off amount, which Plaintiff performed from Texas on December 7, 2021. Even at the point of contractual agreement, Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services in conjunction with Defendant Gero Meyersiek, misrepresented there was lawful and enforceable interest to be waived, as they removed the accrued interest from the Title IV-D Program mandated support record system in order to cover up from the Plaintiff, and from federal and Texas authorities the unlawful 12% compound rate. After fraudulently inducing Plaintiff in Texas to agree to and to perform on the contract, the Defendants immediately put the interest back into the Title IV-D Program-mandated automated support record system and started to seize Plaintiff's properties in Texas under color of Rhode Island state law.

6. The final judgment is on its face violative of binding First Circuit caselaw that mandates lower courts to *stay* monetary damages claims when applying Younger Abstention. *See DeMauro v. DeMauro*, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1997) (relying on *Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706 (1996) in holding that abstention does not allow for dismissal of damages claim).

7. 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) has been in effect since the enactment of the Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act several decades ago, and Congress's original intent was to combat poverty within the populace of single mothers and children in welfare cases; Congress at no time intended to shift the undue burden of Rhode Island's 12% compound interest on overdue support under color of Rhode Island state law to noncustodial parents, whether targeting Texas or across the country, which in welfare cases Rhode Island converts the 12% compound interest to assigned debts owed by noncustodial parents to Rhode Island's state agencies and state

government, representing underhanded unlawful state revenue unlawfully obtained through the legal framework of Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, targeting unsuspecting noncustodial parents victims. As a legal point of a state's lawful application of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) within the First Circuit, New Hampshire, in compliance with the letter of federal law, opts into Title IV-D Program and opts not to charge any interest whatsoever, as per the letter of law and the original intent of Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A). Similarly, Texas charges 6% in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A).

8. Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Service's illegal denial and obstruction of access to Plaintiff's own child support case file that contains the incriminating illegal and arguably criminal scheme of removing the interest rate from the Title IV-D Program mandated and federally funded support record system to cover up the unlawful 12% compound interest from federal and Texas authorities, as well as from the Plaintiff in Texas, violates due process, obstructs justice, obstructs a federally funded and federal program proceeding, and the legal framework of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 654 and 42 U.S.C. § 666.

9. Judge Smith's dismissal of Texas Plaintiff's legal remedy monetary damages and breach of contract fraudulent inducement damages claims under Younger Abstention in this Court of law represents irreparable harm violative of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment and the First Amendment access to the Court. The undisputable fact remains, Plaintiff's legal remedy request for monetary damages in this court of law consisting of twenty-two causes of action that cannot be dismissed under Younger Abstention, namely monetary damages claims of breach of contract fraudulent inducement, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, misrepresentation,

negligent misrepresentation, intentional/fraudulent misrepresentation, common law bad faith, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, breach of fraudulent concealment/common law fraud, concealed fraud, tort of deceit, reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiff, deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiff, abuse of process, breach of duty, accounting fraud, fraud cover up, RI Government Tort Liability (R.I. Gen. Laws 9-31-1, *et seq.*), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Reckless Indifference of Plaintiff's Clearly Established Constitutional Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of Fourth Amendment Illegal Seizure of Plaintiff's Texas Property, state tort of liability against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil RICO [ECF 25].

10. Judge Smith’s legally-unsupported and factually-unsupported, and “legally insufficient” opinion that the limited jurisdiction family court is an adequate forum to raise Plaintiff’s federal legal damages claims of breach of contract et al., contravenes Rhode Island law: R.I. Gen Laws 8-10-3 makes clear that family court is not a court of general jurisdiction, can only conduct bench trials functioning as a court of equity, not of law, and prohibits family court from exercising jurisdiction over breach of contract claims et al between the Texas Plaintiff and the Defendants; family court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s federal causes of actions; lacks the jurisdiction to summon a jury for jury trial in a court of law.

11. Finally, but equally critically, twenty-one days post judgment Plaintiff discovered troubling new evidence on November 9, 2023, that Judge Smith appears to have impermissibly acted in favor of the interests of the defendants – he is automatically disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455, because as a partner in his past practice and firm, the state government and the Rhode Island Judiciary were not only his clients, but continue to be that firm’s major client under a flat fee contract and he has knowledge of the defendants’ actions in this action – as a major

partner in his firm, the Rhode Island Judiciary is his and his firm's past and current clients, the state government actors and the state courts actors, cooperate in the routine establishment and enforcement of 12% compound interest under the legal framework of Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, where 12% compound interest is disallowed under 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A). To the objective observer, having knowledge of the facts and circumstances of this case, and being a partner in his past firm that continues to have the Rhode Island Judiciary as a client, Judge Smith appears biased in favor of the defendants' interest to continue raking in state revenue under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that explicitly disallows state debts of 12% compound interest assigned to Rhode Island that the state actors who cover up the 12% compound rate by obstructing the noncustodial parent's access to her own child support case file that is further violative of the due process provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 654 and §666, in Rhode Island's federally funded operation with funds appropriated by Congress intended for the *lawful* operation of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Although under the judicial self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. §455, the Texas Plaintiff is not expected to cull court records in the Rhode Island state courts for judicial conflict of interest, nevertheless the Plaintiff in good faith and diligently attempted to perform a remote search of Rhode Island's electronic court case management system, Odyssey in 2023. In so doing, Plaintiff discovered troubling newly-discovered evidence that the Rhode Island Judiciary, while publicly representing that the 2014 \$6 million state transition from paper courts to electronic courts promises *all court users* will be able to call up court documents remotely from their mobile devices, in reality Rhode Island adopted rules only denying the public and pro se litigants remote access to court case information, including pro-se litigants' own case records, that both the public and all litigants had equal statutory, common law and constitutional rights of access in paper courts – Judge

Smith's firm's clients, the Rhode Island Judiciary, therefore implemented electronic court public access denials that obstructed Plaintiff's and the public's discovery of Judge Smith's judicial disqualification regarding his former clients such as the state courts, the defendant state actors and other conflict entities.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

11. The United States Supreme Court in 2020 reaffirmed, in *GEORGIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC*, 590 U.S. ____ (2020), the century-old government edicts doctrine, making clear that officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of—and therefore cannot monopolize access—the works they create in the course of their official duties. The U.S. Supreme Court previously applied that doctrine to hold that non-binding, explanatory legal materials when created by judges who possess the authority to make and interpret the law shall not monopolize access to it. *See Banks v. Manchester*, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). Tyler Technologies is a for profit organization that aims to facilitate public access to government judge-created records and legal materials. Tyler Technologies is contracted by the Rhode Island Judiciary to implement the State’s electronic courts in 2013 and together, they both publicly represented that access to the contents of judge-created laws records will be readily called on mobile devices to *all* court users, namely, to the Public and to pro se litigators.

12. Under the government edicts doctrine, judges may not be considered the “authors” of the works they produce in the course of their official duties as judges. That rule applies regardless of whether a given material carries the force of law. In *Banks v. Manchester*, 128 U. S. 244 (1888) the Supreme Court concluded that “the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head note” cannot “be regarded as their author or their proprietor. *Banks*, 128 U. S. at 253 (emphasis in original).

Rather, “[t]he whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all.” *Ibid.* (citing *Nash v. Lathrop*, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N. E. 559 (1886)). These cases establish a straightforward rule: Because judges are vested with the authority to make and interpret the law, they cannot be the “author” of the works they prepare “in the discharge of their judicial duties.” *Banks*, 128 U. S., at 253. This rule applies both to binding works (such as opinions) and to non-binding works (such as headnotes and syllabi). *Ibid.* The animating principle behind this rule is that no one can own the law. “Every citizen is presumed to know the law,” and “it needs no argument to show . . . that all should have free access” to its contents. *Nash*, 142 Mass., at 35, 6 N. E., at 560 (cited by *Banks*, 128 U. S., at 253–254). Rather than attempting to catalog the materials that constitute “the law,” the doctrine bars the officials responsible for creating the law from being considered the “author[s]” of “whatever work they perform in their capacity” as lawmakers. *Ibid.* (emphasis added). Because these officials are generally empowered to make and interpret law, their “whole work” is deemed part of the “authentic exposition and interpretation of the law” and must be “free for publication to all.” *Ibid.*

13. Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies monopoly of publication of the judge-created laws and their “whole works” making and interpreting the law that explicitly by design deny access to the Public and to the Pro Se Litigant runs afoul of the government edicts doctrine.

14. Courts have long understood the government edicts doctrine to apply to legislative materials. See, e.g., *Nash*, 142 Mass., at 35, 6 N. E., at 560 (judicial opinions and statutes stand “on substantially the same footing” for purposes of the government edicts doctrine); moreover, just as the doctrine applies to “whatever work [judges] perform in their capacity as judges,”

Banks, 128 U. S., at 253, it applies to whatever work judges perform in their capacity as judges. *Banks*, following *Wheaton* and the “judicial consensus” it inspired, denied publication monopoly protection to judicial opinions without excepting concurrences and dissents that carry no legal force. 128 U. S., at 253 (emphasis deleted). As every judge learns the hard way, “comments in [a] dissenting opinion” about legal principles and precedents “are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.” *Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz*, 449 U. S. 166, 177, n. 10 (1980). Yet such comments are covered by the government edicts doctrine because they come from an official with authority to make and interpret the law. Indeed, *Banks* went even further and withheld publication monopoly protection from headnotes and syllabi produced by judges. 128 U. S., at 253. Surely these supplementary materials do not have the force of law, yet they are covered by the doctrine. The simplest explanation is the one *Banks* provided: These non-binding works are not copyrightable because of who creates them—judges acting in their judicial capacity. See *ibid.* The textual basis for the doctrine is the “authorship” requirement, which unsurprisingly focuses on—the author, the judges. The Supreme Court long ago interpreted the ‘author’ to be officials empowered to speak with the force of law. The doctrine distinguishes between some authors (who are empowered to speak with the force of law) and others (who are not). The Supreme Court explicitly rejects allowing the States to “monetize its entire suite of legislative and judicial history. With today’s *digital tools*, States might even launch a subscription or pay-per-law service.” See *Georgia v. Public Resources Org.* at 590 U. S. ____ (2020) It is obviously explicitly clear that the Supreme Court refers to the prohibition against the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology’s monopolization of the digital publication of DIGITAL COURT JUDICIAL COURT RECORDS that denies publication access of judge-created laws and their work materials to the Public and to Pro Se Litigants.

15. There is no legitimate Rhode Island government interest in the knowing illegal denial of access to the public and to pro se litigants the digital records of the Rhode Island Judiciary's and Tyler Technologies' illegal monopolization of digital publication of judge-created laws involving the establishment nor enforcement of unlawful 12% compound interest violative of explicitly clear 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) within the legal framework of Title IV-D Program targeting noncustodial parties in Texas who are outside of Rhode Island that Rhode Island already knows is unenforceable in Texas, and thus had removed the 12% compound interest in 2018 calculated to cover it up from federal and Texas authorities. Rhode Island's abuse of the legal framework of the government edict doctrine and the legal framework of Title IV-D Program are diametrically at odds with the intent of Congress and binding caselaws of the U.S. Supreme Court. The civil conspiracy to cover up the illegal machinery of the digital electronic courts in Rhode Island is clear. *See Turner v. Rogers*, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011). *See Georgia v. Public Resources Org.* at 590 U. S. ____ (2020); *See* HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, Section 8: Child Support Enforcement Program, in 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 8-1, 8-2 (2004). *See* Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351. Where the mother receives public aid, federal and state governments will provide the child support payment to the mother and hold the father indebted to the government for that amount. In cases where the mother is not dependent on welfare, the government has largely stayed out of the fray. *See* HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, *supra* note 38. Yet, this case does not involve a welfare case, as the custodial father is wealthy, but the Defendants are motivated by retaliation against the Plaintiff for suing them ten years ago in Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian

et al, Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al, Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013), in which Plaintiff sued them, *inter alia*, for monetary damages claims for extortion by the Rhode Island state court’s under color of state law abuse of the legal frame work of another federal-funded human services program Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, through which Rhode Island demanded that Plaintiff pay the state court actor \$55,000.00 per visitation if she wanted to see her children in Rhode Island, because the state court stated in writing they believed Plaintiff married “a rich oil man” in Texas, absent any other legally sufficient basis. Plaintiff had reported this *prima facie* extortion under color of state law and under color of federal law 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, to the federal law enforcement authorities, *e.g.*, the F.B.I. in Texas and the Office of the U.S. Department of Justice in Texas. Here, Plaintiff’s retaliation damages claims have been issues pending before the Court since September 1, 2023 [ECF 25], at which point Judge Smith was disqualified under the self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. § 455, additionally given the fact Judge Smith had also self-recused from Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al, Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al, Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013) ten years ago. *See In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[under §455] the judge is expected to recuse sua sponte, where necessary, even if no party has requested it”).

II. ARGUMENT

16. Plaintiff has appealed the Court’s/Judge Smith’s judgment in its entirety in the related case, Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023) and respectfully submits that she is likely to secure a complete reversal of this Court’s

holding that the judicially created doctrine of Younger Abstention applies to the *dismissal* of her monetary damages and breach of contract damages claims.

17. Plaintiff further submits that she is likely to secure a complete reversal of this Court's

in this case.

18. Conducting state proceedings funded by federal funding appropriated by Congress under Title IV of the Social Security Act in state monopolized electronic courts that violate the long-established government edict doctrine as it related to the Public's access of the digital publication of judge-created laws and violate the Constitution targeting Texas assets and Texas parties for illegal 12% compound interest involving fraudulent inducement that cannot be enforceable in Texas is the prima facie example of government fraud and government waste, warranting cut off from federal funding at the very minimum. Not even Judge Smith, friend of the Rhode Island Judiciary, can punt these egregious state activities to later addressment via the attention of the Supreme Court and to Congress Appropriation Committees, wrongfully using Younger Abstention.

19. Judge Smith's holding is defect in claiming without a shred of factual basis that Plaintiff can raise her federal monetary damages claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract claims in the jurisdictionally defective Rhode Island family court, that R.I. Gen. Laws 8-10-3 plainly states the family court is **not** a court of general jurisdiction, and which lacks the jurisdiction over the controversy for legal relief of monetary damages tort claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims over both the Plaintiff and all the named defendants.

20. Plaintiff seeks a new trial or a stay pending appeal as Plaintiff's likelihood of success on appeal, together with the lopsided balance of hardships, weigh heavily in favor of granting the stay being sought pending appellate review.

A. Plaintiff is Likely To Succeed On Appeal Of the Judgment Ordered By the Court:

21. Although Plaintiff recognizes that the Court has ruled against her as to the scope of relief, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on appeal of those issues, and has raised serious legal questions and presented a substantial case. *See Arnold v. Garlock, Inc.*, 278 F.3d 426, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2001).

22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference her prior remedy arguments. Plaintiff reserves the right to make any and all arguments on appeal.

23. Among the substantial questions raised by Plaintiff is whether the Court erred in awarding Defendants dismissal of Plaintiff's monetary damages claim in this First Circuit under Younger Abstention and erred in failing to self-execute 28 U.S.C. § 455. And Plaintiff respectfully submits that she is likely to succeed on appeal in arguing that, in these circumstances, dismissal was not properly ordered in the particular circumstances of this case pursuant to established binding First Circuit caselaws on both the Court's errors applying Younger Abstention as well as judicial disqualification. *See DeMauro v. DeMauro*, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1997); *In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998); *Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706 (1996). *See also Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry*, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1988). ("Younger abstention does not apply to claims for monetary damages.")

24. Absence of a new trial or a stay of the judgment will erode confidence in the Judiciary in the First Circuit by creating an impression that it is violating national law regarding the government edict doctrine and setting illegal new national policy regarding the Title IV-D Program. It may also have the effect of “encouraging forum shopping.” *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). It further “undermines the judicial system’s goals of allowing the ‘airing of competing views’ and permitting multiple judges and circuits to weigh in on significant issues.” *See also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (traditional remedial principles account for “the public interest” and “the balance of equities”); *EME Homer City Generation, LP v. EPA*, 795 F.3d 118, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J.) (declining to vacate unlawful agency action under the APA because “vacatur could cause substantial disruption”). In this context, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state government tort monetary damages claims entered by the Court could cause substantial disruption to the *uniform* application of the legal framework of the Title IV-D Program Congress explicitly intended.

25. The serious legal questions raised in this case regarding the scope of remedy go beyond the questions of whether a Younger abstention is applicable to federal monetary damages claims and or the feeble assertion of *comity* applied to the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology’s gross violation of the government edict doctrine—and indeed, those questions should not have even entered into this case. Here, among Plaintiff’s challenges was to state Judiciary, Tyler Technologies and agency actions, and Plaintiff pursued fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims and tort monetary damages claims. Instead, the Court at law cannot vacate a federal statute—i.e., cannot “delete a previously enacted statute from the books” such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See also* Jonathan F. Mitchell, *The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy*, 104 Va.

L. Rev. 933, 936 (2018) (“The federal courts have no authority to erase a duly enacted law from the statute books, and they have no power to veto or suspend a statute. The power of judicial review is more limited.” (footnotes omitted)). Legal monetary damages relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that would hold the Rhode Island state government accountable under the Rhode Island Government Tort Act for Rhode Island government actors’ tortious actions violating the legal framework of the Title IV-D Program federal statutes targeting the Plaintiff in Texas was a legal remedy conferred by Congress to federal courts to grant legal relief appropriate in this case. The Court has an unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction conferred to it by Congress. *See Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs*, 571 U.S. 69 (2013)

26. With respect, although the Court has entered a judgment otherwise, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal of the Final Judgment sufficient to justify a stay of the judgment.

B. The Balance of the Equities Overwhelmingly Favors the Requested New Trial or Stay

27. The balance of the equities overwhelmingly favors a new trial or stay: The State of Rhode Island plainly lacks any legitimate interest in the State's systemic knowing violation of the government edict doctrine and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that they now target Plaintiff in Texas, and which they sought to cover up from federal and Texas authorities, as well as from Plaintiff, by knowingly and unlawfully removing interest from the automated support record system. Americans outside of Rhode Island re fraudulently, unlawfully and systemically fleeced by Rhode Island's illegal scheme that is illegally funded through the State's defrauding of the United States lying to the United States that these activities are eligible for federal funds

appropriated by Congress for the legal administration of Title IV Program of the Social Security Act.

28. Defendants will face no harm from Plaintiff's requested new trial or stay. The judgment that is specifically directed to and protects the prevailing Defendants from legal accountability of their illegal actions, is further issued by a disqualified judge, Judge Smith, who was the former counsel for the Defendants and a partner of the firm whose major client is the Rhode Island Judiciary, *e.g.*, Rhode Island state government entities, including the state courts and state agencies. The requested new trial or stay will thus impose no hardship on the prevailing Defendants at all.

29. By contrast, the public and the Plaintiff face significant harm if now new trial is ordered or the judgment is not stayed. As an initial matter, “any time a [government]” violates “statutes enacted by representatives of its people,” the people “suffer a form of irreparable injury.” *Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (citation omitted). But the harm here is much greater and more far-reaching. The government edict doctrine is willfully violated by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology in a civil conspiracy to cover up the illegal state family court creating judge-created laws ordering and enforcing 12% compound interest, aided and abetted by the Department of Human Services - Title IV-D requires the uniform application and compliance by participating States with the Social Security Act. Congress’s as well as the United States through the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ interest in the uniform compliance of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A), § 654 and 42 U.S.C. § 666 are well established. The States are reimbursed 66% of the cost of operations through federal funding appropriated by Congress under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. The Defendants’ arbitrary illegal removal of the illegal unenforceable 12%

compound interest from the automated support record system and cover up of their illegal 12% compound interest scheme from the federal and Texas authorities targeting Texas properties and targeting the Plaintiff in Texas demonstrates Rhode Island government agencies (who are former clients of Judge Smith) knowingly committed criminal schemes illegally seizing Plaintiff's properties interstate in Texas that they know are violative of federal criminal codes and Texas civil and penal codes. *See, e.g.,* Social Services Amendments of 1974 (1975 Act), Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2351 (42 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) (adding Title IV-D to the Social Security Act). The program, which is administered by the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary), provides that States with approved plans for child and spousal support that meet federal requirements are reimbursed by the federal government for a significant sixty-six percent (66%) of the costs of operating their child-support enforcement programs. 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(2)(C). In 1975, Congress adopted Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. § 651 *et seq.*, and established the general statutory framework that exists today. *See* 1975 Act § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2351; *Blessing v. Freestone*, 520 U.S. 329, 333-335 (1997) (describing program). Congress ultimately set the federal share of reimbursable expenditures at 66%, 42 U.S.C. 655(a)(2), but expanded the availability of matching funds at the 90% level for State expenditures for automating data processing systems to improve “the monitoring of support payments, the maintenance of accurate records regarding the payment of support. Therefore, the Defendants’ illegal operations cannot be funded by Congressional appropriations.

30. Judge Smith’s failure to self-execute his disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 as well as Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct, then his subsequent refusal to recuse in the related case, Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023), upon Plaintiff’s request after she raised newly discovered discovery post judgment

on October 6, 2023 of his direct and past public sector law practice’s contract legal representation of the Defendants, state courts, state agencies and other conflict entities, have the appearance, to the objective observer, of the Court’s issuance of judgment in favor of the Defendants in error that contravenes established First Circuit case law on Younger Abstention as well as disqualification, calculated to benefit the interests of his former clients, as partner of his former firm that represents the Rhode Island Judiciary and the state government.

31. Moreover, the Court’s judgment effectively functions as a denial of Plaintiff’s access to this Court of law to redress her legal monetary damages claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims. It is well-settled that even minimal loss of First Amendment freedoms, “unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1976) (plurality)); *see also Elrod*, 427 U.S. at 373.; *N.Y. Times v. United States*, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971). Accordingly, Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of success on the merits, will suffer irreparable injury without a stay, and a stay will not injure others while furthering the public interest.

III. CONCLUSION

27. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal of the Judgment ordered, and has demonstrated that the balance of the equities favors a new trial or a stay. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court stay the final judgment for the duration of appellate proceedings relating to the related Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 16, 2023, I filed the within Motion with the Clerk of the Court via email.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 16, 2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

**MARY SEGUIN'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59
MOTION**

I, MARY SEGUIN, hereby declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1746(2) that the following statements are true and correct:

1. That I am the Plaintiff, Pro Se, in the above captioned matter.
2. That I exercised, am exercising and continue to exercise my statutory right to appear pro se party in the above captioned civil matter in federal court by statute 28 U.S.C. sec. 1654.

3. That in state proceedings in Rhode Island, I am required to comply with Rhode Island Article X. Rules Governing Electronic Filing, Rule 2. Official Court Record, (a) Official Court Record. “Upon the implementation of the Electronic Filing System (“EFS”) in each court, all documents shall be filed electronically and shall be the official court record.”
4. That the state proceedings in which I am a party are public and are not about child custody nor involve a minor.
5. That the **Rhode Island Family Court**, through its adoption and promulgation of **Administrative Order 2021-01 A2)** mandated that all child support interest matters shall be heard remotely via WebEx. Further, **Administrative Order 2021-01 B1)** mandated that all non-emergency filings shall be filed using the electronic filing system in accordance with the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, which is the **Odyssey system**.
6. That the **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION, Rule 5. Access to Case Information, (c) Remote Access to Case Information. (1) Policy. To allow limited Remote Access to the Database through the Public Portal. Non-public case types shall not be remotely accessible except for certain case types to attorneys who have entered an appearance in a case. (2) Content. (a) The Public, Self-represented Litigants and Parties. The Public, self-represented litigants, and parties shall have Remote Access to the register of actions or Docket but shall not have Remote Access to other Electronic Case Information”** bar, deny, violate, abridge, infringe and interfere with Pro Se Litigants’ and the Public’s fundamental rights to access public court records and Pro Se Litigants’ fundamental right to meaningful access to the courts. See **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION” Rule 5(c)(2)(a) “The Public, Self-represented Litigants and Parties. The Public, self-represented litigants, and parties shall have Remote Access to the register of actions or Docket but shall not have Remote Access to other Electronic Case Information.”** See also **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY, Access to Case Information, 2. Remote Access to Case Information A. The Public, Self-represented Litigants, and Parties to a Case, The public, self-represented litigants, and parties in a case shall have remote access to the register of actions or docket but shall not have remote access to other electronic case information.”**
7. That I, the Plaintiff, learned and verified on July 10, 2023 directly from the Rhode Island Judiciary itself through numerous (14) correspondences with the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023, pursuant to my RI Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) request for public records from the Rhode Island Judiciary, that as a matter of State policy, State Court Rule, and Judiciary Rule, in the digital courts implemented by the Rhode Island Judiciary, the State Court, the Rhode Island

Judiciary deny remote digital access of the Rhode Island Judiciary's monopolized publication of court and judicial records using the digital tool maintained and published by Tyler Technologies, Odyssey, including judge-created, judge-authored court decisions arising from state proceedings in the State's digital electronic courts, and digital court transcripts ordered by and paid by pro-se litigants that are published by the Judiciary digitally on Tyer Technologies' Odyssey are also denied access to the Public, pro-se litigants, and parties to the litigation (who are represented by counsel). The Rhode Island State Court only grants remote access to digital court and judicial records created by judges produced in digital courts to Rhode Island attorneys and state and federal agencies that are approved by the Rhode Island Judiciary's monopoly. On this matter, I corresponded in writing fourteen (14) APRA correspondence emails with Mr. Justin Correa, Esq. and Ms. Alexandra Kriss of the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023.

8. That the State Defendants in this matter electronically file all notices using another electronic filing system that is even separate and different from the EFS (Odyssey).
9. That the State Defendants' court electronic filings are not noticed to me in Texas.
10. That the State Defendants' court electronic filings are not visible to me on the Rhode Island courts' EFS.
11. That the State Defendants' court electronic filing court records cannot be accessed remotely by me, solely because I am a self-represented litigant.
12. That the State Defendants' court electronic filing court records cannot be accessed remotely by the public, by self-represented litigants, nor by parties to the case, but can be accessed remotely and instantly through the internet by attorneys in Rhode Island and state and federal agencies.
13. That the Rhode Island Court Clerks state to me over the phone that they are prohibited from reading the contents of the court records over the phone to me.
14. That the Rhode Island Court virtual clerks state to me over the phone that even they are unable to see or access the court record information of filings by the State Defendants from the virtual clerks' access portals.
15. That the Rhode Island Electronic Filing System, case management system, rules and practices outright and unconstitutionally restrict and deny access to the court to three classes: (1) the public; (2) pro-se litigants; (3) parties to the case (who are represented by counsel), and is obviously outright reserved for only the government and Rhode Island attorneys.
16. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS.
17. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices, and

withdrew from my-initiated RI EOHHS agency appeal in 2022 in a scheme to procure a favorable judgment in a state proceeding that deny my federal constitutional and due process rights in Texas.

18. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices, and initiated the family court state proceeding on January 31, 2023 before the Covid Emergency Declaration was lifted.
19. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices that appear to **only allow remote, instant and full court access to a restricted club of R.I. lawyers and the government**, pose unconstitutional and undue burden on me, a citizen of Texas over 2,500 miles away.
20. That the State Defendant have full knowledge of the egregiously unfair due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices that deny me access to the required **electronic court transcripts** prepared by the court reporter and electronically filed in the state EFS that **I ordered and paid for** for appeal, but the State Defendants have instant remote access by state court design.
21. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the above unconstitutional restriction on access to court records and information to the public and non-lawyers is deliberate, by design and calculated to be unfair, violating constitutional guarantees of full and fair opportunity to raise claims in state proceedings.
22. That the above-raised unconstitutional restrictions are not exhaustive.
23. That my federal monetary damages claims on the unconstitutionality of the Rhode Island state court rules, practices and proceedings that violate the government edict doctrine and violate the pro-se litigants', such as my-self, federal constitutional rights: (1) federal constitutional right of equal access to the courts, (2) federal constitutional right to equal access to court records to receive information on the contents of all electronically filed notices, pleadings, court decisions, and transcripts that I myself ordered and paid for for appeal that are required to be electronically filed by state court rules and practices, (3) federal constitutional due process right and equal right to be given equal and timely notice of electronic filings and entries by the courts (including court decisions, court orders, court judgments, full docket entries, etc.) that the Rhode Island Judiciary deliberately deny by category all pro-se litigants access to court information, namely the contents of judicial/court records of cases to which I am the self-represented party, (4) federal constitutional due process right to be heard (Rhode Island Superior Court threatens me, the Texas pro-se plaintiff, with denial of my request to conduct WebEx hearings for the purpose of denying the Texas pro-se litigant access to the court and to be heard), (5) federal constitutional due process right to decision by a neutral decision-maker (the court that denies pro-se litigant

access to the court and the corollary opportunity to be heard fails the neutral decision-maker test). This list is not exhaustive.

24. That I seek to sue in federal court the State Defendants and add additional defendants.
25. I am an out-of-state diversity and a pro-se litigant in two state proceedings in Rhode Island, and have been unconstitutionally singled out by the State Judiciary, by category “self-represented litigant,” to be barred from accessing electronic case information authored by judges and which the Judiciary has a monopoly in the publication of the judge-created laws in which state court cases I am the pro-se party, and therefore have standing to raise claims against this unconstitutional state practice and unconstitutional state court practice and rules. I understand the Rhode Island Judiciary’s monopoly in the digital publication of judge-created laws in the Judiciary’ implemented digital/electronic courts and the Judiciary’s denial to the Public and to me from accessing the monopolized electronic publication of the judge-created laws in the court records violate the government edict doctrine.
26. Additionally, my fundamental First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right and common law right to equal, meaningful, and timely access to judicial records and public court records in litigation, given timely notice, adequate opportunity to be heard and to decision by a neutral decision-maker are fundamental First and Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Critically, the unconstitutional abridgement, infringement, and denial of judicial and court records to out-of-state pro-se litigants by the Rhode Island State Courts, Rhode Island State Judiciary and the Rhode Island Superior Court Bench Bar Committee directly relate to Younger Abstention Exception.
27. The State Defendants deliberately file all the State’s pleadings outside of the State’s electronic filing system, “Odyssey,” and deliberately use a wholly different un-named electronic filing system, different and separate from that (“Odyssey”) provided for pro-se litigants, so that pro-se litigants do not receive any requisite automated electronic notices of court motions or pleadings the State Defendants file electronically, nor are pro se litigants able to electronically access the content information of the State Defendants’ electronically-filed pleadings. The only way the pro se litigant, such as me, the Texas Plaintiff, can access the court record is to personally go over 2,500 miles away to the courthouse in Rhode Island to access the court pleading information, or get a “courtesy notice” via email or get a “courtesy notice” through U.S. Mail sent by the State Defendants at whim. The State Defendants deliberately fail to send the notices electronically or by U.S. Mail, and the state courts deliberately promulgated court rules disallowing the public, pro-se litigants and even the parties who are represented by lawyers, remote access to court records, and critically, deny access to crucial court decisions, judgments and orders of public cases, as well as deny remote access to the transcripts ordered by pro-se litigants for appeal. Critically, the State court’s abridgment and denial of access to court documents to the pro se litigant and the general public result in the

unconstitutional abridgment and denial of equal, timely and meaningful access to court complaints, decisions, judgments and orders. What is truly shocking is that the Rhode Island Judiciary even denies and/or bars pro-se litigants remote access of court transcripts that were ordered by pro-se litigants for appeal.

28. Thirdly, the Texas Pro-Se Plaintiff discovered and verified the fact, on or about July 7, 2023, that the Rhode Island Judiciary, using the aforesaid state court rule barring, by category, pro-se litigants from accessing court case information remotely, bars the Plaintiff by category (“self-represented litigant”) from accessing state court proceeding transcripts that the Texas Plaintiff ordered and paid for, for appeal. In other words, the RI Supreme Court Clerk stated to the Texas Plaintiff that the Plaintiff, in Texas, is unconstitutionally barred from remotely accessing the transcripts of court proceedings that she ordered and paid for in her appeal to the RI Supreme Court in the Plaintiff-initiated APRA action **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215**, and yet the State Defendants are inequitably granted instant and free remote access to those very transcripts that the Texas Plaintiff ordered and paid for, for appeal. The federal Texas Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court the extension of time to present the new evidence and plead the verified facts.
29. Fourthly, the Texas Plaintiff discovered and verified the fact, on or about July 11, 2023, that, despite the Texas Plaintiff’s several phone inquiries to the RI Superior Court in the past several weeks regarding the status of the appeal, the RI Superior Court, for undisclosed reasons, failed and continue to fail to relinquish jurisdiction and transfer the court case file of **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** to the RI Supreme Court within the requisite 60 days after Plaintiff’s filing of Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2023, as required by the RI Supreme Court rules and procedures. At the same time, the Texas Plaintiff verified the fact that the Plaintiff-ordered transcripts of the state proceedings in the Federal Plaintiff-initiated state APRA action **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** show the RI Superior Court further unconstitutionally sought to deny the Texas Plaintiff access to the state court and opportunity to be heard by outright threatening the Plaintiff in open court that the Judge, David Cruise, during the hearing of March 24, 2023 in that matter, shall use the state court’s discretionary power in the future to deny all of the Texas pro-se Plaintiff’s petitions for remote WebEx hearings to effectively deny her access to the state superior court. The state court that denies court access and the opportunity to be heard fails the neutral-decision-maker test required under the Fourteenth Amendment. I now specifically request further the Court to judicially notice that this court access denial and denial to be heard occurred on March 24, 2023, PRIOR to President Biden’s lifting of the COVID-19 National Health Emergency Declaration. I, the Texas Plaintiff, aver this is a direct contributory reason for the RI Superior Court’s failure to transfer the case file to the Supreme Court within 60 days (by June 3, 2023) of the Plaintiff’s filing of Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2023 in **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215**.

30. Fifthly, the Plaintiff presents to this Court and respectfully requests the Court to take judicial notice of the undisputed fact of the court rule-making process in Rhode Island. The 1966 Rules were promulgated by the justices of the superior court pursuant to section 8-6-2 of the General Laws of Rhode Island. This enabling act departed from the Federal Rules Enabling Act and most state enabling legislation conferring rule-making power on the supreme courts of the respective governments. The Rhode Island Enabling Act was adopted in 1940, 1940 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 943, sec. 1. It conferred the power on the justices of the superior court and the 1966 reform was the product of that court. In 1969 an amendment to section 8-6-2 made the Rules thereafter adopted by the trial courts subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 239, sec 2. Therefore, all public records relating to the adoption and promulgation of the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION” are “made in the course of, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency, ““agency” or "public body" means any executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory, or administrative body of the state, or any political subdivision thereof” as per R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2, a.k.a. RI Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”). Even though the Rhode Island Enabling Act conferred the power on the judiciary public body to promulgate and adopt court rules, a.k.a. rule-making process, the Rhode Island Judiciary, pursuant to the Plaintiff’s APRA request for public records, denied the Plaintiff’s APRA request within the 10 business day period, as well as denies it possesses public records, as defined by APRA, relating to the rule-making process by the judiciary of the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION,” including denying possession of public records that show the intent of the rule-makers to promulgate and adopt court rules denying fundamental right of public access to electronic case information remotely to the public, to self-represented litigants, and to parties to a case. **See Exhibit D** fourteen (14) APRA correspondence emails between the Plaintiff and/or with Mr. Justin Correa, Esq. and Ms. Alexandra Kriss of the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023. The Texas pro-se Plaintiff respectfully requests the extension of time to present the new evidence and plead the newly verified facts and claims, and amend the complaint, which is further in the interest of judicial economy. The Plaintiff further seeks to appeal and file her claim against the implausible denial by the RI Judiciary, which is conferred by the Rhode Island Enabling Act to make rules of the court, that it possesses public records relating to the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION,” that the judiciary, conferred power by the Rhode Island Enabling Act, “made in the course of, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency, ““agency” or "public body" means any executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory, or administrative body of the state, or any political subdivision thereof” as per R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2, a.k.a. RI Access to

(2) The Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' denial to the Public and to all Pro Se Litigants all access and the denial of free access to the contents of the law created, authored, and deliberated by the Rhode Island Judiciary.

(3) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies to knowingly fail to properly integrate the legacy electronic court case management systems used by Rhode Island Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services during the implementation of Odyssey from 2013 to 2014 (the State's official electronic court filing and electronic case management system), so that these state agencies' filings are discriminately invisible only to the Public, to Pro Se Litigants and to the Rhode Island Virtual Clerk of the Courts in the Rhode Island Family Court, a limited jurisdiction court of record. The State's filings are only visible to the judges and to the State filers, thus manipulating the proceeding towards a foregone conclusion in favor of the State filers.

(4) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies to misrepresent to the Public and to the Pro Se Litigants that the implemented electronic court case records of judge created laws are available to *all* court users, in order to cover up their monopolization of the publication of law denies the Public and the Pro Se Litigant access to the judge-created laws.

(5) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services that the State routinely establishes and enforces 12% compound interest on child and spousal support in Title IV of the Social Security Act state family court proceedings, in violation of the uniform statutory requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and

if the State opts to do so, between 3% to 6% *simple interest*, not 12% compound interest, targeting noncustodial parents victims. In welfare cases, support are assigned by the custodial parent to the State, and the 12% compound interest represents a fee for the State's "services" in the support's establishment and enforcement paid to the State, which at 12% compound interest represents lucrative, illegally obtained revenue to the State actors, who are financially incentivized to obtain as much as possible.

(6) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services and Tyler Technologies to knowingly fail to properly integrate Odyssey with the State's legacy electronic court filing system resulting in the State's filings seeking illegal 12% compound interest, as well as to deny the Public and to Pro Se Litigants' access to their publication of judge-created law records for the purpose of cover up of this wholesale illegal defraud of the court, extortionary defraud under color of state law targeting the unsuspecting noncustodial parents victims, and defraud of the United States (66% of the cost of these child support "operations" is funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services through Title IV of the Social Security Act through funds appropriated by Congress through the annual budget appropriations.)

(7) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Tyler Technologies to operate the Title IV Program of the Social Security Act in all manners violative of due process, in prima facie due process violative State Electronic Courts, for the purpose of generating state revenue through fraud and deceit, through conspired tortious interference of rights of access to the courts, rights of

access to state case documents, and rights of access to judge-created laws targeting litigants, targeting the Public and targeting Pro Se Litigants.

(8) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Tyler Technologies to cover up their public-access-denied publication of state judge-created laws of illegal 12% compound interest benefiting the state's revenue by adopting a State policy not to establish nor enforce any interest in *interstate* support cases only, calculated to cover up the collective fraud from federal enforcement officials and other states' enforcement officials of court orders (laws) showing 12% compounded interest established and funded under Title IV that are facially illegally violative of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) which explicitly provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and *if* the State opts to do so, between 3% to 6% *simple interest*, not 12% compound interest. The federal Title IV Program regulation by Congressional intent explicitly preempts any related state laws of all participating states.

(9) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services and Barbara Grady and Gero Meyersiek to use the fraudulent, First Amendment-, Fourth Amendment-, Fifth Amendment-, Seventh Amendment-, and Fourteenth Amendment violative state court machinery weaponizing Title IV Program of the Social Security Act to target the Plaintiff *pro se* noncustodial parent in Texas to retaliate against Plaintiff for her past lawsuits against them, namely ten years ago in Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013), in which Plaintiff sued them, *inter alia*, for monetary damages claims for extortion by the Rhode Island state

court's under color of state law abuse of the legal frame work of another federal-funded human services program Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, through which Rhode Island demanded that Plaintiff pay the state court actor \$55,000.00 per visitation if Plaintiff wanted to see her children in Rhode Island, because the state court stated in writing they believed Plaintiff married "a rich oil man" in Texas, absent any other legally sufficient basis. Plaintiff had reported this *prima facie* extortion under color of state law and under color of federal law 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, to the federal law enforcement authorities, *e.g.*, the F.B.I. in Texas and the Office of the U.S.

Department of Justice in Texas. Here, Plaintiff's **retaliation** damages claims have been issues pending before the Court since September 1, 2023 [ECF 25], at which point Judge Smith was disqualified under the self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. § 455, additionally given the fact Judge Smith had also self-recused from Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013) ten years ago. *See In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[under §455] the judge is expected to recuse sua sponte, where necessary, even if no party has requested it”).

(10) The Rhode Island Judiciary continues the pattern of cover up by denying Plaintiff's request for public judicial records related to the monopoly of publication of judge-created records submitted to the State Judiciary pursuant to the Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act ("RI APRA").

4. Plaintiff obtained new evidence on October 6, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary is a former client of Judge Smith, and on November 9, 2023, Plaintiff obtained new evidence that the

Rhode Island Judiciary remains a major client of Judge Smith's former law firm. Plaintiff's due diligence search for conflict of interest has been impeded by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies monopoly of publication of judge-created laws in the state's electronic court system and their denial of access to the judge-created laws, and Plaintiff, as a member of the Public and proceeding pro se without a Rhode Island Attorney license, the issuance of which is also monopolized by the Rhode Island Judiciary, has further been denied access to official records, including through the Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act, consistent with a pattern of civil conspiracy cover up.

5. A new trial or a stay of the Judgment is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Plaintiff, and to Americans across the First Circuit who would be needlessly deprived of access to the federal courts of law in the First Circuit for monetary damages redress - the judicially created doctrine of Younger Abstention that functioned as a court of equity - regarding Plaintiff's monetary damages claims against the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' scheme to monopolize the publication of judge-created laws that denies, tortiously interferes, tortiously abridges and tortiously obstruct the Public access to those very laws; regarding Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services' unlawful seizures of interstate Texas properties outside of Rhode Island under color of Rhode Island state law based on legally insufficient interest charge on overdue support based on the unlawful rate of 12% compound interest that is disallowed under Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and *if* the State opts to do so, between 3% to 6% *simple interest*, *not* 12% compound interest. And this is on top of Defendants' breach of contract that was brokered by Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services on behalf of the agency's client; the contract between the custodial parent client, defendant Gero

Meyersiek and the Texas Plaintiff stipulated that the custodial parent waived interest upon the Texas Plaintiff paying a lump sum of \$104,185.98 pay-off amount, which Plaintiff performed from Texas on December 7, 2021. Even at the point of contractual agreement, Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services in conjunction with Defendant Gero Meyersiek, misrepresented there was lawful and enforceable interest to be waived, as they removed the accrued interest from the Title IV-D Program mandated support record system in order to cover up from the Plaintiff, and from federal and Texas authorities the unlawful 12% compound rate. After fraudulently inducing Plaintiff in Texas to agree to and to perform on the contract, the Defendants immediately put the interest back into the Title IV-D Program-mandated automated support record system and started to seize Plaintiff's properties in Texas under color of Rhode Island state law.

6. The final judgment is on its face violative of binding First Circuit caselaw that mandates lower courts to **stay** monetary damages claims when applying Younger Abstention. *See DeMauro v. DeMauro*, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1997) (relying on *Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706 (1996) in holding that abstention does not allow for dismissal of damages claim).

7. 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) has been in effect since the enactment of the Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act several decades ago, and Congress’s original intent was to combat poverty within the populace of single mothers and children in welfare cases; Congress at no time intended to shift the undue burden of Rhode Island’s 12% compound interest on overdue support under color of Rhode Island state law to noncustodial parents, whether targeting Texas or across the country, which in welfare cases Rhode Island converts the 12% compound interest to assigned debts owed by noncustodial parents to Rhode Island’s state agencies and state

government, representing underhanded unlawful state revenue unlawfully obtained through the legal framework of Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, targeting unsuspecting noncustodial parents victims. As a legal point of a state's lawful application of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) within the First Circuit, New Hampshire, in compliance with the letter of federal law, opts into Title IV-D Program and opts not to charge any interest whatsoever, as per the letter of law and the original intent of Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A). Similarly, Texas charges 6% in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A).

8. Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Service's illegal denial and obstruction of access to Plaintiff's own child support case file that contains the incriminating illegal and arguably criminal scheme of removing the interest rate from the Title IV-D Program mandated and federally funded support record system to cover up the unlawful 12% compound interest from federal and Texas authorities, as well as from the Plaintiff in Texas, violates due process, obstructs justice, obstructs a federally funded and federal program proceeding, and the legal framework of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 654 and 42 U.S.C. § 666.

9. Judge Smith's dismissal of Texas Plaintiff's legal remedy monetary damages and breach of contract fraudulent inducement damages claims under Younger Abstention in this Court of law represents irreparable harm violative of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment and the First Amendment access to the Court. The undisputable fact remains, Plaintiff's legal remedy request for monetary damages in this court of law consisting of twenty-two causes of action that cannot be dismissed under Younger Abstention, namely monetary damages claims of breach of contract fraudulent inducement, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, misrepresentation,

negligent misrepresentation, intentional/fraudulent misrepresentation, common law bad faith, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, breach of fraudulent concealment/common law fraud, concealed fraud, tort of deceit, reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiff, deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiff, abuse of process, breach of duty, accounting fraud, fraud cover up, RI Government Tort Liability (R.I. Gen. Laws 9-31-1, *et seq.*), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Reckless Indifference of Plaintiff's Clearly Established Constitutional Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of Fourth Amendment Illegal Seizure of Plaintiff's Texas Property, state tort of liability against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil RICO [ECF 25].

10. Judge Smith’s legally-unsupported and factually-unsupported, and “legally insufficient” opinion that the limited jurisdiction family court is an adequate forum to raise Plaintiff’s federal legal damages claims of breach of contract et al., contravenes Rhode Island law: R.I. Gen Laws 8-10-3 makes clear that family court is not a court of general jurisdiction, can only conduct bench trials functioning as a court of equity, not of law, and prohibits family court from exercising jurisdiction over breach of contract claims et al between the Texas Plaintiff and the Defendants; family court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s federal causes of actions; lacks the jurisdiction to summon a jury for jury trial in a court of law.

11. Finally, but equally critically, twenty-one days post judgment Plaintiff discovered troubling new evidence on November 9, 2023, that Judge Smith appears to have impermissibly acted in favor of the interests of the defendants – he is automatically disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455, because as a partner in his past practice and firm, the state government and the Rhode Island Judiciary were not only his clients, but continue to be that firm’s major client under a flat fee contract and he has knowledge of the defendants’ actions in this action – as a major

partner in his firm, the Rhode Island Judiciary is his and his firm's past and current clients, the state government actors and the state courts actors, cooperate in the routine establishment and enforcement of 12% compound interest under the legal framework of Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, where 12% compound interest is disallowed under 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A). To the objective observer, having knowledge of the facts and circumstances of this case, and being a partner in his past firm that continues to have the Rhode Island Judiciary as a client, Judge Smith appears biased in favor of the defendants' interest to continue raking in state revenue under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that explicitly disallows state debts of 12% compound interest assigned to Rhode Island that the state actors who cover up the 12% compound rate by obstructing the noncustodial parent's access to her own child support case file that is further violative of the due process provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 654 and §666, in Rhode Island's federally funded operation with funds appropriated by Congress intended for the *lawful* operation of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Although under the judicial self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. §455, the Texas Plaintiff is not expected to cull court records in the Rhode Island state courts for judicial conflict of interest, nevertheless the Plaintiff in good faith and diligently attempted to perform a remote search of Rhode Island's electronic court case management system, Odyssey in 2023. In so doing, Plaintiff discovered troubling newly-discovered evidence that the Rhode Island Judiciary, while publicly representing that the 2014 \$6 million state transition from paper courts to electronic courts promises *all court users* will be able to call up court documents remotely from their mobile devices, in reality Rhode Island adopted rules only denying the public and pro se litigants remote access to court case information, including pro-se litigants' own case records, that both the public and all litigants had equal statutory, common law and constitutional rights of access in paper courts – Judge

Smith's firm's clients, the Rhode Island Judiciary, therefore implemented electronic court public access denials that obstructed Plaintiff's and the public's discovery of Judge Smith's judicial disqualification regarding his former clients such as the state courts, the defendant state actors and other conflict entities.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

11. The United States Supreme Court in 2020 reaffirmed, in *GEORGIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC*, 590 U.S. ____ (2020), the century-old government edicts doctrine, making clear that officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of—and therefore cannot monopolize access—the works they create in the course of their official duties. The U.S. Supreme Court previously applied that doctrine to hold that non-binding, explanatory legal materials when created by judges who possess the authority to make and interpret the law shall not monopolize access to it. *See Banks v. Manchester*, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). Tyler Technologies is a for profit organization that aims to facilitate public access to government judge-created records and legal materials. Tyler Technologies is contracted by the Rhode Island Judiciary to implement the State’s electronic courts in 2013 and together, they both publicly represented that access to the contents of judge-created laws records will be readily called on mobile devices to *all* court users, namely, to the Public and to pro se litigators.

12. Under the government edicts doctrine, judges may not be considered the “authors” of the works they produce in the course of their official duties as judges. That rule applies regardless of whether a given material carries the force of law. In *Banks v. Manchester*, 128 U. S. 244 (1888) the Supreme Court concluded that “the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head note” cannot “be regarded as their author or their proprietor. *Banks*, 128 U. S. at 253 (emphasis in original).

Rather, “[t]he whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all.” *Ibid.* (citing *Nash v. Lathrop*, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N. E. 559 (1886)). These cases establish a straightforward rule: Because judges are vested with the authority to make and interpret the law, they cannot be the “author” of the works they prepare “in the discharge of their judicial duties.” *Banks*, 128 U. S., at 253. This rule applies both to binding works (such as opinions) and to non-binding works (such as headnotes and syllabi). *Ibid.* The animating principle behind this rule is that no one can own the law. “Every citizen is presumed to know the law,” and “it needs no argument to show . . . that all should have free access” to its contents. *Nash*, 142 Mass., at 35, 6 N. E., at 560 (cited by *Banks*, 128 U. S., at 253–254). Rather than attempting to catalog the materials that constitute “the law,” the doctrine bars the officials responsible for creating the law from being considered the “author[s]” of “whatever work they perform in their capacity” as lawmakers. *Ibid.* (emphasis added). Because these officials are generally empowered to make and interpret law, their “whole work” is deemed part of the “authentic exposition and interpretation of the law” and must be “free for publication to all.” *Ibid.*

13. Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies monopoly of publication of the judge-created laws and their “whole works” making and interpreting the law that explicitly by design deny access to the Public and to the Pro Se Litigant runs afoul of the government edicts doctrine.

14. Courts have long understood the government edicts doctrine to apply to legislative materials. See, e.g., *Nash*, 142 Mass., at 35, 6 N. E., at 560 (judicial opinions and statutes stand “on substantially the same footing” for purposes of the government edicts doctrine); moreover, just as the doctrine applies to “whatever work [judges] perform in their capacity as judges,”

Banks, 128 U. S., at 253, it applies to whatever work judges perform in their capacity as judges. *Banks*, following *Wheaton* and the “judicial consensus” it inspired, denied publication monopoly protection to judicial opinions without excepting concurrences and dissents that carry no legal force. 128 U. S., at 253 (emphasis deleted). As every judge learns the hard way, “comments in [a] dissenting opinion” about legal principles and precedents “are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.” *Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz*, 449 U. S. 166, 177, n. 10 (1980). Yet such comments are covered by the government edicts doctrine because they come from an official with authority to make and interpret the law. Indeed, *Banks* went even further and withheld publication monopoly protection from headnotes and syllabi produced by judges. 128 U. S., at 253. Surely these supplementary materials do not have the force of law, yet they are covered by the doctrine. The simplest explanation is the one *Banks* provided: These non-binding works are not copyrightable because of who creates them—judges acting in their judicial capacity. See *ibid.* The textual basis for the doctrine is the “authorship” requirement, which unsurprisingly focuses on—the author, the judges. The Supreme Court long ago interpreted the “author” to be officials empowered to speak with the force of law. The doctrine distinguishes between some authors (who are empowered to speak with the force of law) and others (who are not). The Supreme Court explicitly rejects allowing the States to “monetize its entire suite of legislative and judicial history. With today’s *digital tools*, States might even launch a subscription or pay-per-law service.” See *Georgia v. Public Resources Org.* at 590 U. S. ____ (2020) It is obviously explicitly clear that the Supreme Court refers to the prohibition against the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology’s monopolization of the digital publication of DIGITAL COURT JUDICIAL COURT RECORDS that denies publication access of judge-created laws and their work materials to the Public and to Pro Se Litigants.

15. There is no legitimate Rhode Island government interest in the knowing illegal denial of access to the public and to pro se litigants the digital records of the Rhode Island Judiciary's and Tyler Technologies' illegal monopolization of digital publication of judge-created laws involving the establishment nor enforcement of unlawful 12% compound interest violative of explicitly clear 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) within the legal framework of Title IV-D Program targeting noncustodial parties in Texas who are outside of Rhode Island that Rhode Island already knows is unenforceable in Texas, and thus had removed the 12% compound interest in 2018 calculated to cover it up from federal and Texas authorities. Rhode Island's abuse of the legal framework of the government edict doctrine and the legal framework of Title IV-D Program are diametrically at odds with the intent of Congress and binding caselaws of the U.S. Supreme Court. The civil conspiracy to cover up the illegal machinery of the digital electronic courts in Rhode Island is clear. *See Turner v. Rogers*, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011). *See Georgia v. Public Resources Org.* at 590 U. S. ____ (2020); *See* HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, Section 8: Child Support Enforcement Program, in 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 8-1, 8-2 (2004). *See* Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351. Where the mother receives public aid, federal and state governments will provide the child support payment to the mother and hold the father indebted to the government for that amount. In cases where the mother is not dependent on welfare, the government has largely stayed out of the fray. *See* HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, *supra* note 38. Yet, this case does not involve a welfare case, as the custodial father is wealthy, but the Defendants are motivated by retaliation against the Plaintiff for suing them ten years ago in Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian

et al, Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al, Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013), in which Plaintiff sued them, *inter alia*, for monetary damages claims for extortion by the Rhode Island state court’s under color of state law abuse of the legal frame work of another federal-funded human services program Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, through which Rhode Island demanded that Plaintiff pay the state court actor \$55,000.00 per visitation if she wanted to see her children in Rhode Island, because the state court stated in writing they believed Plaintiff married “a rich oil man” in Texas, absent any other legally sufficient basis. Plaintiff had reported this *prima facie* extortion under color of state law and under color of federal law 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, to the federal law enforcement authorities, *e.g.*, the F.B.I. in Texas and the Office of the U.S. Department of Justice in Texas. Here, Plaintiff’s retaliation damages claims have been issues pending before the Court since September 1, 2023 [ECF 25], at which point Judge Smith was disqualified under the self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. § 455, additionally given the fact Judge Smith had also self-recused from Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al, Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al, Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013) ten years ago. *See In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[under §455] the judge is expected to recuse sua sponte, where necessary, even if no party has requested it”).

II. ARGUMENT

16. Plaintiff has appealed the Court’s/Judge Smith’s judgment in its entirety in the related case, Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023) and respectfully submits that she is likely to secure a complete reversal of this Court’s

holding that the judicially created doctrine of Younger Abstention applies to the *dismissal* of her monetary damages and breach of contract damages claims.

17. Plaintiff further submits that she is likely to secure a complete reversal of this Court's

in this case.

18. Conducting state proceedings funded by federal funding appropriated by Congress under Title IV of the Social Security Act in state monopolized electronic courts that violate the long-established government edict doctrine as it related to the Public's access of the digital publication of judge-created laws and violate the Constitution targeting Texas assets and Texas parties for illegal 12% compound interest involving fraudulent inducement that cannot be enforceable in Texas is the prima facie example of government fraud and government waste, warranting cut off from federal funding at the very minimum. Not even Judge Smith, friend of the Rhode Island Judiciary, can punt these egregious state activities to later addressment via the attention of the Supreme Court and to Congress Appropriation Committees, wrongfully using Younger Abstention.

19. Judge Smith's holding is defect in claiming without a shred of factual basis that Plaintiff can raise her federal monetary damages claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract claims in the jurisdictionally defective Rhode Island family court, that R.I. Gen. Laws 8-10-3 plainly states the family court is **not** a court of general jurisdiction, and which lacks the jurisdiction over the controversy for legal relief of monetary damages tort claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims over both the Plaintiff and all the named defendants.

20. Plaintiff seeks a new trial or a stay pending appeal as Plaintiff's likelihood of success on appeal, together with the lopsided balance of hardships, weigh heavily in favor of granting the stay being sought pending appellate review.

A. Plaintiff is Likely To Succeed On Appeal Of the Judgment Ordered By the Court:

21. Although Plaintiff recognizes that the Court has ruled against her as to the scope of relief, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on appeal of those issues, and has raised serious legal questions and presented a substantial case. *See Arnold v. Garlock, Inc.*, 278 F.3d 426, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2001).

22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference her prior remedy arguments. Plaintiff reserves the right to make any and all arguments on appeal.

23. Among the substantial questions raised by Plaintiff is whether the Court erred in awarding Defendants dismissal of Plaintiff's monetary damages claim in this First Circuit under Younger Abstention and erred in failing to self-execute 28 U.S.C. § 455. And Plaintiff respectfully submits that she is likely to succeed on appeal in arguing that, in these circumstances, dismissal was not properly ordered in the particular circumstances of this case pursuant to established binding First Circuit caselaws on both the Court's errors applying Younger Abstention as well as judicial disqualification. *See DeMauro v. DeMauro*, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1997); *In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998); *Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706 (1996). *See also Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry*, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1988). ("Younger abstention does not apply to claims for monetary damages.")

24. Absence of a new trial or a stay of the judgment will erode confidence in the Judiciary in the First Circuit by creating an impression that it is violating national law regarding the government edict doctrine and setting illegal new national policy regarding the Title IV-D Program. It may also have the effect of “encouraging forum shopping.” *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). It further “undermines the judicial system’s goals of allowing the ‘airing of competing views’ and permitting multiple judges and circuits to weigh in on significant issues.” *See also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (traditional remedial principles account for “the public interest” and “the balance of equities”); *EME Homer City Generation, LP v. EPA*, 795 F.3d 118, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J.) (declining to vacate unlawful agency action under the APA because “vacatur could cause substantial disruption”). In this context, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state government tort monetary damages claims entered by the Court could cause substantial disruption to the *uniform* application of the legal framework of the Title IV-D Program Congress explicitly intended.

25. The serious legal questions raised in this case regarding the scope of remedy go beyond the questions of whether a Younger abstention is applicable to federal monetary damages claims and or the feeble assertion of *comity* applied to the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology’s gross violation of the government edict doctrine—and indeed, those questions should not have even entered into this case. Here, among Plaintiff’s challenges was to state Judiciary, Tyler Technologies and agency actions, and Plaintiff pursued fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims and tort monetary damages claims. Instead, the Court at law cannot vacate a federal statute—i.e., cannot “delete a previously enacted statute from the books” such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See also* Jonathan F. Mitchell, *The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy*, 104 Va.

L. Rev. 933, 936 (2018) (“The federal courts have no authority to erase a duly enacted law from the statute books, and they have no power to veto or suspend a statute. The power of judicial review is more limited.” (footnotes omitted)). Legal monetary damages relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that would hold the Rhode Island state government accountable under the Rhode Island Government Tort Act for Rhode Island government actors’ tortious actions violating the legal framework of the Title IV-D Program federal statutes targeting the Plaintiff in Texas was a legal remedy conferred by Congress to federal courts to grant legal relief appropriate in this case. The Court has an unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction conferred to it by Congress. *See Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs*, 571 U.S. 69 (2013)

26. With respect, although the Court has entered a judgment otherwise, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal of the Final Judgment sufficient to justify a stay of the judgment.

B. The Balance of the Equities Overwhelmingly Favors the Requested New Trial or Stay

27. The balance of the equities overwhelmingly favors a new trial or stay: The State of Rhode Island plainly lacks any legitimate interest in the State's systemic knowing violation of the government edict doctrine and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that they now target Plaintiff in Texas, and which they sought to cover up from federal and Texas authorities, as well as from Plaintiff, by knowingly and unlawfully removing interest from the automated support record system. Americans outside of Rhode Island re fraudulently, unlawfully and systemically fleeced by Rhode Island's illegal scheme that is illegally funded through the State's defrauding of the United States lying to the United States that these activities are eligible for federal funds

appropriated by Congress for the legal administration of Title IV Program of the Social Security Act.

28. Defendants will face no harm from Plaintiff's requested new trial or stay. The judgment that is specifically directed to and protects the prevailing Defendants from legal accountability of their illegal actions, is further issued by a disqualified judge, Judge Smith, who was the former counsel for the Defendants and a partner of the firm whose major client is the Rhode Island Judiciary, *e.g.*, Rhode Island state government entities, including the state courts and state agencies. The requested new trial or stay will thus impose no hardship on the prevailing Defendants at all.

29. By contrast, the public and the Plaintiff face significant harm if now new trial is ordered or the judgment is not stayed. As an initial matter, "any time a [government]" violates "statutes enacted by representatives of its people," the people "suffer a form of irreparable injury." *Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (citation omitted). But the harm here is much greater and more far-reaching. The government edict doctrine is willfully violated by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology in a civil conspiracy to cover up the illegal state family court creating judge-created laws ordering and enforcing 12% compound interest, aided and abetted by the Department of Human Services - Title IV-D requires the uniform application and compliance by participating States with the Social Security Act. Congress's as well as the United States through the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' interest in the uniform compliance of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A), § 654 and 42 U.S.C. § 666 are well established. The States are reimbursed 66% of the cost of operations through federal funding appropriated by Congress under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. The Defendants' arbitrary illegal removal of the illegal unenforceable 12%

compound interest from the automated support record system and cover up of their illegal 12% compound interest scheme from the federal and Texas authorities targeting Texas properties and targeting the Plaintiff in Texas demonstrates Rhode Island government agencies (who are former clients of Judge Smith) knowingly committed criminal schemes illegally seizing Plaintiff's properties interstate in Texas that they know are violative of federal criminal codes and Texas civil and penal codes. *See, e.g.,* Social Services Amendments of 1974 (1975 Act), Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2351 (42 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) (adding Title IV-D to the Social Security Act). The program, which is administered by the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary), provides that States with approved plans for child and spousal support that meet federal requirements are reimbursed by the federal government for a significant sixty-six percent (66%) of the costs of operating their child-support enforcement programs. 42 U.S.C. §655(a)(2)(C). In 1975, Congress adopted Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. §651 *et seq.*, and established the general statutory framework that exists today. *See* 1975 Act § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2351; *Blessing v. Freestone*, 520 U.S. 329, 333-335 (1997) (describing program). Congress ultimately set the federal share of reimbursable expenditures at 66%, 42 U.S.C. 655(a)(2), but expanded the availability of matching funds at the 90% level for State expenditures for automating data processing systems to improve “the monitoring of support payments, the maintenance of accurate records regarding the payment of support. Therefore, the Defendants’ illegal operations cannot be funded by Congressional appropriations.

30. Judge Smith’s failure to self-execute his disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 as well as Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct, then his subsequent refusal to recuse in the related case, Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023), upon Plaintiff’s request after she raised newly discovered discovery post judgment

on October 6, 2023 of his direct and past public sector law practice’s contract legal representation of the Defendants, state courts, state agencies and other conflict entities, have the appearance, to the objective observer, of the Court’s issuance of judgment in favor of the Defendants in error that contravenes established First Circuit case law on Younger Abstention as well as disqualification, calculated to benefit the interests of his former clients, as partner of his former firm that represents the Rhode Island Judiciary and the state government.

31. Moreover, the Court’s judgment effectively functions as a denial of Plaintiff’s access to this Court of law to redress her legal monetary damages claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims. It is well-settled that even minimal loss of First Amendment freedoms, “unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1976) (plurality)); *see also Elrod*, 427 U.S. at 373.; *N.Y. Times v. United States*, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971). Accordingly, Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of success on the merits, will suffer irreparable injury without a stay, and a stay will not injure others while furthering the public interest.

III. CONCLUSION

27. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal of the Judgment ordered, and has demonstrated that the balance of the equities favors a new trial or a stay. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court stay the final judgment for the duration of appellate proceedings relating to the related Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Mary Seguin

/s/ Mary Seguin

Phone: (281)744-2016

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 16, 2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

MARY SEGUIN’S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S RULE 60(b)
MOTION

I, MARY SEGUIN, hereby declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1746(2) that the following statements are true and correct:

1. That I am the Plaintiff, Pro Se, in the above captioned matter.
2. That I exercised, am exercising and continue to exercise my statutory right to appear pro se party in the above captioned civil matter in federal court by statute 28 U.S.C. sec. 1654.

3. That in state proceedings in Rhode Island, I am required to comply with Rhode Island Article X. Rules Governing Electronic Filing, Rule 2. Official Court Record, (a) Official Court Record. “Upon the implementation of the Electronic Filing System (“EFS”) in each court, all documents shall be filed electronically and shall be the official court record.”
4. That the state proceedings in which I am a party are public and are not about child custody nor involve a minor.
5. That the **Rhode Island Family Court**, through its adoption and promulgation of **Administrative Order 2021-01 A2)** mandated that all child support interest matters shall be heard remotely via WebEx. Further, **Administrative Order 2021-01 B1)** mandated that all non-emergency filings shall be filed using the electronic filing system in accordance with the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, which is the **Odyssey system**.
6. That the **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION, Rule 5. Access to Case Information, (c) Remote Access to Case Information. (1) Policy. To allow limited Remote Access to the Database through the Public Portal. Non-public case types shall not be remotely accessible except for certain case types to attorneys who have entered an appearance in a case. (2) Content. (a) The Public, Self-represented Litigants and Parties. The Public, self-represented litigants, and parties shall have Remote Access to the register of actions or Docket but shall not have Remote Access to other Electronic Case Information”** bar, deny, violate, abridge, infringe and interfere with Pro Se Litigants’ and the Public’s fundamental rights to access public court records and Pro Se Litigants’ fundamental right to meaningful access to the courts. See **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION” Rule 5(c)(2)(a) “The Public, Self-represented Litigants and Parties. The Public, self-represented litigants, and parties shall have Remote Access to the register of actions or Docket but shall not have Remote Access to other Electronic Case Information.”** See also **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY, Access to Case Information, 2. Remote Access to Case Information A. The Public, Self-represented Litigants, and Parties to a Case, The public, self-represented litigants, and parties in a case shall have remote access to the register of actions or docket but shall not have remote access to other electronic case information.”**
7. That I, the Plaintiff, learned and verified on July 10, 2023 directly from the Rhode Island Judiciary itself through numerous (14) correspondences with the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023, pursuant to my RI Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) request for public records from the Rhode Island Judiciary, that as a matter of State policy, State Court Rule, and Judiciary Rule, in the digital courts implemented by the Rhode Island Judiciary, the State Court, the Rhode Island

- Judiciary deny remote digital access of the Rhode Island Judiciary's monopolized publication of court and judicial records using the digital tool maintained and published by Tyler Technologies, Odyssey, including judge-created, judge-authored court decisions arising from state proceedings in the State's digital electronic courts, and digital court transcripts ordered by and paid by pro-se litigants that are published by the Judiciary digitally on Tyler Technologies' Odyssey are also denied access to the Public, pro-se litigants, and parties to the litigation (who are represented by counsel). The Rhode Island State Court only grants remote access to digital court and judicial records created by judges produced in digital courts to Rhode Island attorneys and state and federal agencies that are approved by the Rhode Island Judiciary's monopoly. On this matter, I corresponded in writing fourteen (14) APRA correspondence emails with Mr. Justin Correa, Esq. and Ms. Alexandra Kriss of the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023.
8. That the State Defendants in this matter electronically file all notices using another electronic filing system that is even separate and different from the EFS (Odyssey).
 9. That the State Defendants' court electronic filings are not noticed to me in Texas.
 10. That the State Defendants' court electronic filings are not visible to me on the Rhode Island courts' EFS.
 11. That the State Defendants' court electronic filing court records cannot be accessed remotely by me, solely because I am a self-represented litigant.
 12. That the State Defendants' court electronic filing court records cannot be accessed remotely by the public, by self-represented litigants, nor by parties to the case, but can be accessed remotely and instantly through the internet by attorneys in Rhode Island and state and federal agencies.
 13. That the Rhode Island Court Clerks state to me over the phone that they are prohibited from reading the contents of the court records over the phone to me.
 14. That the Rhode Island Court virtual clerks state to me over the phone that even they are unable to see or access the court record information of filings by the State Defendants from the virtual clerks' access portals.
 15. That the Rhode Island Electronic Filing System, case management system, rules and practices outright and unconstitutionally restrict and deny access to the court to three classes: (1) the public; (2) pro-se litigants; (3) parties to the case (who are represented by counsel), and is obviously outright reserved for only the government and Rhode Island attorneys.
 16. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS.
 17. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices, and

withdrew from my-initiated RI EOHHS agency appeal in 2022 in a scheme to procure a favorable judgment in a state proceeding that deny my federal constitutional and due process rights in Texas.

18. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices, and initiated the family court state proceeding on January 31, 2023 before the Covid Emergency Declaration was lifted.
19. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices that appear to **only allow remote, instant and full court access to a restricted club of R.I. lawyers and the government**, pose unconstitutional and undue burden on me, a citizen of Texas over 2,500 miles away.
20. That the State Defendant have full knowledge of the egregiously unfair due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices that deny me access to the required **electronic court transcripts** prepared by the court reporter and electronically filed in the state EFS that **I ordered and paid for** for appeal, but the State Defendants have instant remote access by state court design.
21. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the above unconstitutional restriction on access to court records and information to the public and non-lawyers is deliberate, by design and calculated to be unfair, violating constitutional guarantees of full and fair opportunity to raise claims in state proceedings.
22. That the above-raised unconstitutional restrictions are not exhaustive.
23. That my federal monetary damages claims on the unconstitutionality of the Rhode Island state court rules, practices and proceedings that violate the government edict doctrine and violate the pro-se litigants', such as my-self, federal constitutional rights: (1) federal constitutional right of equal access to the courts, (2) federal constitutional right to equal access to court records to receive information on the contents of all electronically filed notices, pleadings, court decisions, and transcripts that I myself ordered and paid for for appeal that are required to be electronically filed by state court rules and practices, (3) federal constitutional due process right and equal right to be given equal and timely notice of electronic filings and entries by the courts (including court decisions, court orders, court judgments, full docket entries, etc.) that the Rhode Island Judiciary deliberately deny by category all pro-se litigants access to court information, namely the contents of judicial/court records of cases to which I am the self-represented party, (4) federal constitutional due process right to be heard (Rhode Island Superior Court threatens me, the Texas pro-se plaintiff, with denial of my request to conduct WebEx hearings for the purpose of denying the Texas pro-se litigant access to the court and to be heard), (5) federal constitutional due process right to decision by a neutral decision-maker (the court that denies pro-se litigant

access to the court and the corollary opportunity to be heard fails the neutral decision-maker test). This list is not exhaustive.

24. That I seek to sue in federal court the State Defendants and add additional defendants.
25. I am an out-of-state diversity and a pro-se litigant in two state proceedings in Rhode Island, and have been unconstitutionally singled out by the State Judiciary, by category “self-represented litigant,” to be barred from accessing electronic case information authored by judges and which the Judiciary has a monopoly in the publication of the judge-created laws in which state court cases I am the pro-se party, and therefore have standing to raise claims against this unconstitutional state practice and unconstitutional state court practice and rules. I understand the Rhode Island Judiciary’s monopoly in the digital publication of judge-created laws in the Judiciary’ implemented digital/electronic courts and the Judiciary’s denial to the Public and to me from accessing the monopolized electronic publication of the judge-created laws in the court records violate the government edict doctrine.
26. Additionally, my fundamental First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right and common law right to equal, meaningful, and timely access to judicial records and public court records in litigation, given timely notice, adequate opportunity to be heard and to decision by a neutral decision-maker are fundamental First and Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Critically, the unconstitutional abridgement, infringement, and denial of judicial and court records to out-of-state pro-se litigants by the Rhode Island State Courts, Rhode Island State Judiciary and the Rhode Island Superior Court Bench Bar Committee directly relate to Younger Abstention Exception.
27. The State Defendants deliberately file all the State’s pleadings outside of the State’s electronic filing system, “Odyssey,” and deliberately use a wholly different un-named electronic filing system, different and separate from that (“Odyssey”) provided for pro-se litigants, so that pro-se litigants do not receive any requisite automated electronic notices of court motions or pleadings the State Defendants file electronically, nor are pro se litigants able to electronically access the content information of the State Defendants’ electronically-filed pleadings. The only way the pro se litigant, such as me, the Texas Plaintiff, can access the court record is to personally go over 2,500 miles away to the courthouse in Rhode Island to access the court pleading information, or get a “courtesy notice” via email or get a “courtesy notice” through U.S. Mail sent by the State Defendants at whim. The State Defendants deliberately fail to send the notices electronically or by U.S. Mail, and the state courts deliberately promulgated court rules disallowing the public, pro-se litigants and even the parties who are represented by lawyers, remote access to court records, and critically, deny access to crucial court decisions, judgments and orders of public cases, as well as deny remote access to the transcripts ordered by pro-se litigants for appeal. Critically, the State court’s abridgment and denial of access to court documents to the pro se litigant and the general public result in the

unconstitutional abridgment and denial of equal, timely and meaningful access to court complaints, decisions, judgments and orders. What is truly shocking is that the Rhode Island Judiciary even denies and/or bars pro-se litigants remote access of court transcripts that were ordered by pro-se litigants for appeal.

28. Thirdly, the Texas Pro-Se Plaintiff discovered and verified the fact, on or about July 7, 2023, that the Rhode Island Judiciary, using the aforesaid state court rule barring, by category, pro-se litigants from accessing court case information remotely, bars the Plaintiff by category (“self-represented litigant”) from accessing state court proceeding transcripts that the Texas Plaintiff ordered and paid for, for appeal. In other words, the RI Supreme Court Clerk stated to the Texas Plaintiff that the Plaintiff, in Texas, is unconstitutionally barred from remotely accessing the transcripts of court proceedings that she ordered and paid for in her appeal to the RI Supreme Court in the Plaintiff-initiated APRA action **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215**, and yet the State Defendants are inequitably granted instant and free remote access to those very transcripts that the Texas Plaintiff ordered and paid for, for appeal. The federal Texas Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court the extension of time to present the new evidence and plead the verified facts.
29. Fourthly, the Texas Plaintiff discovered and verified the fact, on or about July 11, 2023, that, despite the Texas Plaintiff’s several phone inquiries to the RI Superior Court in the past several weeks regarding the status of the appeal, the RI Superior Court, for undisclosed reasons, failed and continue to fail to relinquish jurisdiction and transfer the court case file of **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** to the RI Supreme Court within the requisite 60 days after Plaintiff’s filing of Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2023, as required by the RI Supreme Court rules and procedures. At the same time, the Texas Plaintiff verified the fact that the Plaintiff-ordered transcripts of the state proceedings in the Federal Plaintiff-initiated state APRA action **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** show the RI Superior Court further unconstitutionally sought to deny the Texas Plaintiff access to the state court and opportunity to be heard by outright threatening the Plaintiff in open court that the Judge, David Cruise, during the hearing of March 24, 2023 in that matter, shall use the state court’s discretionary power in the future to deny all of the Texas pro-se Plaintiff’s petitions for remote WebEx hearings to effectively deny her access to the state superior court. The state court that denies court access and the opportunity to be heard fails the neutral-decision-maker test required under the Fourteenth Amendment. I now specifically request further the Court to judicially notice that this court access denial and denial to be heard occurred on March 24, 2023, PRIOR to President Biden’s lifting of the COVID-19 National Health Emergency Declaration. I, the Texas Plaintiff, aver this is a direct contributory reason for the RI Superior Court’s failure to transfer the case file to the Supreme Court within 60 days (by June 3, 2023) of the Plaintiff’s filing of Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2023 in **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215**.

30. Fifthly, the Plaintiff presents to this Court and respectfully requests the Court to take judicial notice of the undisputed fact of the court rule-making process in Rhode Island. The 1966 Rules were promulgated by the justices of the superior court pursuant to section 8-6-2 of the General Laws of Rhode Island. This enabling act departed from the Federal Rules Enabling Act and most state enabling legislation conferring rule-making power on the supreme courts of the respective governments. The Rhode Island Enabling Act was adopted in 1940, 1940 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 943, sec. 1. It conferred the power on the justices of the superior court and the 1966 reform was the product of that court. In 1969 an amendment to section 8-6-2 made the Rules thereafter adopted by the trial courts subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 239, sec 2. Therefore, all public records relating to the adoption and promulgation of the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION” are “made in the course of, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency, ““agency” or "public body" means any executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory, or administrative body of the state, or any political subdivision thereof” as per R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2, a.k.a. RI Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”). Even though the Rhode Island Enabling Act conferred the power on the judiciary public body to promulgate and adopt court rules, a.k.a. rule-making process, the Rhode Island Judiciary, pursuant to the Plaintiff’s APRA request for public records, denied the Plaintiff’s APRA request within the 10 business day period, as well as denies it possesses public records, as defined by APRA, relating to the rule-making process by the judiciary of the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION,” including denying possession of public records that show the intent of the rule-makers to promulgate and adopt court rules denying fundamental right of public access to electronic case information remotely to the public, to self-represented litigants, and to parties to a case. **See Exhibit D** fourteen (14) APRA correspondence emails between the Plaintiff and/with Mr. Justin Correa, Esq. and Ms. Alexandra Kriss of the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023. The Texas pro-se Plaintiff respectfully requests the extension of time to present the new evidence and plead the newly verified facts and claims, and amend the complaint, which is further in the interest of judicial economy. The Plaintiff further seeks to appeal and file her claim against the implausible denial by the RI Judiciary, which is conferred by the Rhode Island Enabling Act to make rules of the court, that it possesses public records relating to the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION,” that the judiciary, conferred power by the Rhode Island Enabling Act, “made in the course of, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency, ““agency” or "public body" means any executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory, or administrative body of the state, or any political subdivision thereof” as per R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2, a.k.a. RI Access to

Public Records Act (“APRA”). Because the RI Superior Court clearly ruled in **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear my/the Texas Plaintiff’s APRA-related claims, I, the Texas Plaintiff, now exercise my statutory and constitutional rights to petition this Federal Court, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 that provides supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims that arose from the same common nuclei of facts, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of civil rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. I, the Plaintiff, respectfully request this Court for the extension of time to file my claims.

31. Plaintiff discovered on October 6, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary and Government Defendants are former clients of Judge Smith, a partner in his former firm, Edwards & Angell.
32. Plaintiff discovered on November 9, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary and Government Defendants are current clients of the firm Edwards & Angell, the former firm of Judge Smith, a partner in the firm.
33. A plain reading of 28 U.S.C. sec. 455 makes clear that Judge Smith is disqualified from this case, and a plain reading of case law makes clear that 28 U.S.C. sec. 455 is self-executing, without necessitating any party's request.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: November 16, 2023

MARY SEGUIN

Mary Seguin

Mary Seguin

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Meghan Kenny

From: Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, November 17, 2023 3:21 PM
To: RID_ECF_INTAKE
Subject: URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY NOTICE OF APPEAL in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS
Attachments: CA 126 Notice of Appeal 111723.pdf
Categories: Being Worked On MK

CAUTION - EXTERNAL:

Dear Clerks of the Court,

I spoke with Clerk Meghan today regarding an update on the docketing of my motions and filing a Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

Following our discussion, I emailed and filed today at 3:10 PM Eastern Time to the Clerk of the Court and respectfully requested the Clerk of the Court to docket today my Rule 60(b)(1) Motion, dated November 17, 2023, that is time-sensitive, per my email below.

Please make sure that my previously filed Rule 60(b)(1) Motion referred in my below email is docketed as ECF 32.

Please make sure that the law is followed so that my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion is NOT forwarded to Chambers prior to docketing. I am NOT requesting the Court leave to file, since it is my right to file the attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion. No Chamber interference should be taking place to prevent the docketing of my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion.

Additionally, subsequent to my filing of the aforementioned Rule 60(b)(1) Motion referenced in my email below that I had requested be docketed as ECF 32, I am herewith filing my attached **Notice of Appeal** in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

Please make sure that my Notice of Appeal filed herewith that is attached to this email is docketed today as ECF 33.

Please make sure that the law is followed so that my attached Notice of Appeal docketed immediately upon receipt and is NOT forwarded to Chambers prior to docketing. I am NOT requesting the Court leave to file, since it is my right to file the attached Notice of Appeal. No Chamber interference should be taking place to prevent the docketing of my attached Notice of Appeal.

Thank you for your assistance.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Seguin
Houston, Texas

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Mary Seguin** <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

Date: Fri, Nov 17, 2023 at 2:10 PM

Subject: URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 60(b)(1) MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil

Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Dear Clerks of the Court,

I spoke with Clerk Meghan today regarding an update on the docketing of my motions.

Following our discussion, I respectfully request the Clerk of the Court to docket today my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion, dated November 17, 2023, that is time-sensitive.

Please make sure that my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion is docketed as ECF 32.

Please make sure that the law is followed that my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion is NOT forwarded to Chambers prior to docketing. I am NOT requesting the Court leave to file, since it is my right to file the attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion. No Chamber interference should be taking place to prevent the docketing of my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion.

Thank you for your assistance.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Seguin
Houston, Texas

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Mary Seguin** <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

Date: Fri, Nov 17, 2023 at 12:33 PM

Subject: Fwd: URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 59 MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Dear Clerks of the Court,

I am respectfully following up on my Rule 59 Motion filing.

Yesterday, November 16, 2023, at 1:31 PM Central Time, I filed via email below, my Rule 59 Motion in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS. As indicated in my email below, I emphasized that docketing the Rule 59 Motion on November 16, 2023 is urgent, to comply with the 28 day filing post-judgment deadline, which my filing meets - November 16, 2023 is within the 28 day deadline of Fed. R. of Civ. P. 59 that tolls the time for filing an appeal.

I followed up with telephone calls to the Clerk's Office at 1:32 PM Central Time, and at 3:42 PM Central Time to request timely docket of my Rule 59 Motion, and the Clerk's Office assured me each time that a deputy clerk is working on it and that it will be docketed on the day it was received and that the docket will reflect the email date stamp of the day the Rule 59 Motion is received by email. Further, I was told that **all filings** I email to the Clerk's Office will be docketed and considered by the Court as having been filed on the day that the motion was emailed to the Clerk's Office.

Therefore, my Rule 59 Motion emailed on November 16, 2023 should be accordingly docketed as **ECF 32** with the **entry of/stating filing on November 16, 2023**, in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

However, as of this time, on November 17, 2023 almost 24 hours later, my Rule 59 Motion is still not docketed.

Additionally, I informed Clerk Meghan that I relied on the Clerk's Office's information provided above, and I had also filed a timely **Rule 60** Motion yesterday, **November 16, 2023**, at **4:39 PM Central Time**, similarly requesting docketing to reflect it was timely filed via email to on November 16, 2023. I emphasized to Clerk Meghan that timeliness is critical, as Rule 60 Motion filed within 28 days post-judgment tolls the time for filing an appeal. Clerk Meghan told me that my Rule 60 Motion was forwarded to Chambers as well. According to the Clerk's Office's information, my **Rule 60 Motion** needs to be docketed/filed as **ECF 33, dated stamped filed on November 16, 2023**.

Moreover, I expressed to Clerk Meghan my concern that the processing of my post-judgment motions forwarded to Chambers and seemingly pending before Chambers without the motions being docketed, impacts my right of appeal 30-days post judgment, and today, Friday, is Day 29. I told the Clerk that under the circumstances in this matter, I seek to preserve for appeal the issues raised in my timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion, and that I seek to preserve my right to appeal within the 30-day postjudgment period.

I respectfully request that this email communication regarding the filing/docketing of my Rule 59 Motion be docketed to accurately reflect the record on appeal along with the Rule 59 Motion at the time the Rule 59 Motion is docketed by the Clerk.

Respectfully submitted,
Mary Seguin

MIME-Version:1.0
From:cmecf@rid.uscourts.gov
To:cmecfnef@rid.uscourts.gov
Bcc:
--Case Participants: Joanna M. Achille (jachille@burnslev.com), Marissa D. Pizana (ddiaz@riag.ri.gov, mpizana@riag.ri.gov), Mary Seguin (maryseguin22022@gmail.com), District Judge William E. Smith (breegan_semonelli@rid.uscourts.gov, john_hindley@rid.uscourts.gov, judge_smith@rid.uscourts.gov, kathryn_alfus@rid.uscourts.gov, mitchell_kosht@rid.uscourts.gov, patrick_mcgourty@rid.uscourts.gov, wesnef2@rid.uscourts.gov, wesnef@rid.uscourts.gov), Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan (juliana_mckittrick@rid.uscourts.gov, mag_judge_sullivan@rid.uscourts.gov, pasnef@rid.uscourts.gov, patrick_cunningham@rid.uscourts.gov)
--Non Case Participants:
--No Notice Sent:

Message-Id:1900843@rid.uscourts.gov
Subject:Activity in Case 1:23-cv-00126-WES-PAS Seguin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services et al Order
Content-Type: text/html

U.S. District Court

District of Rhode Island

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was entered on 11/17/2023 at 3:39 PM EST and filed on 11/17/2023

Case Name: Seguin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services et al

Case Number: 1:23-cv-00126-WES-PAS

Filer:

WARNING: CASE CLOSED on 10/19/2023

Document Number: No document attached

Docket Text:

TEXT ORDER: The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff's email to the Clerk's Office this afternoon. As with its order issued earlier today, the Court construes this email as a motion for leave to file the motion attached to the email and denies leave to file for the reasons given in its earlier text orders. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 11/17/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra)

1:23-cv-00126-WES-PAS Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Joanna M. Achille jachille@burnslev.com

Marissa D. Pizana mpizana@riag.ri.gov, ddiaz@riag.ri.gov

Mary Seguin maryseguin22022@gmail.com

1:23-cv-00126-WES-PAS Notice has been delivered by other means to:

MIME-Version:1.0
From:cmecf@rid.uscourts.gov
To:cmecfnef@rid.uscourts.gov
Bcc:
--Case Participants: Joanna M. Achille (jachille@burnslev.com), Marissa D. Pizana (ddiaz@riag.ri.gov, mpizana@riag.ri.gov), Mary Seguin (maryseguin22022@gmail.com), District Judge William E. Smith (breegan_semonelli@rid.uscourts.gov, john_hindley@rid.uscourts.gov, judge_smith@rid.uscourts.gov, kathryn_alfus@rid.uscourts.gov, mitchell_kosht@rid.uscourts.gov, patrick_mcgourty@rid.uscourts.gov, wesnef2@rid.uscourts.gov, wesnef@rid.uscourts.gov), Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan (juliana_mckittrick@rid.uscourts.gov, mag_judge_sullivan@rid.uscourts.gov, pasnef@rid.uscourts.gov, patrick_cunningham@rid.uscourts.gov)
--Non Case Participants:
--No Notice Sent:

Message-Id:1900703@rid.uscourts.gov
Subject:Activity in Case 1:23-cv-00126-WES-PAS Seguin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services et al Order
Content-Type: text/html

U.S. District Court

District of Rhode Island

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was entered on 11/17/2023 at 1:26 PM EST and filed on 11/17/2023

Case Name: Seguin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services et al

Case Number: 1:23-cv-00126-WES-PAS

Filer:

WARNING: CASE CLOSED on 10/19/2023

Document Number: No document attached

Docket Text:

EXT ORDER: The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff's two recent emails to the Clerk's Office. The Court construes these emails as motions for leave to file the motions attached to those emails and denies leave to file for the reasons given in its earlier text orders. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 11/17/2023. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra)

1:23-cv-00126-WES-PAS Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Joanna M. Achille jachille@burnslev.com

Marissa D. Pizana mpizana@riag.ri.gov, ddiaz@riag.ri.gov

Mary Seguin maryseguin22022@gmail.com

1:23-cv-00126-WES-PAS Notice has been delivered by other means to: